



**Shri Raj Krishen Memorial Lectures**

# **JAINA LOGIC**

*(Anekanta, Naya and Syādvāda)*

*by*

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**Jainology & Prakrits**

**University of Mysore**

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## **LALA RAJ KRISHEN JAIN**

[A brief note on the life and work of Shri Raj Krishen Jain in whose memory the Lecture Series has been instituted in the University of Delhi, Delhi with the fund endowed by Shri Raj Krishen Jain Charitable Trust. Delhi]

Shri Raj Krishen Jain was born at Ambala Cantt. on 11th October, 1900 (Kartik, Krishna, IV), the day on which the Third Jaina Tirthankara Sambhavanatha attained Kevalajagana and the day on which it is customary on the part of Indian Hindu women to observe fast for the welfare of their husbands. He passed away on the 4th February, 1973 at Delhi. He started his career as a clerk in Post & Telegraph Dept. and rose to the rank of Superintendent, Army Headquarters at Simla. In 1921, he resigned his post at the call of Civil Disobedience Movement given by Mahatma Gandhi. His father Shri Rang Lal Jain and grand-father Shri Tuls Ram were Government Contractors who migrated from Sonapat, a District Headquarter now in Haryana.

Lalaji was a well known social and religious worker and a philanthropist too. In 1940, he founded Shri Raj Krishen Jain Charitable Trust under which he constructed the Ahimsa Mandir at 1-Daryaganj, New Delhi which presently houses the Jain Temple, Library for Research Scholars, free Dispensary, Dharmashala (Guest House), Temple Nursing Home etc. The said Trust grants scholarships to deserving students. In 1947 he donated a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to Anjuman Taraque-e-Urdu for the development of Urdu Language. Another instance of his broadmindedness lies in the fact that during the days of partition of India when brutal riots broke out, he braved himself in saving the valuable library of Anjuman Taraque-e-Urdu and the precious lives of many Muslims and Hindus by offering

them shelter, food, etc. He was not sectarian in his approach as is illustrated by his help to Bhikkhu Dhammavara of Combodia when he migrated to Delhi from Pak-occupied Kashmir and established a Buddhist Temple and Ashok Mission Vihar in Mehrauli (near Delhi). In 1952 when Acharya Vinoba Bhave visited Delhi in connection with his Bhoodan Movement, Lalaji donated his entire 150 Bighas of Agricultural Land in village Arthala near Delhi. He was responsible for the repair of the National Archives of India and the preservation of 1500 years old palm-leaf manuscripts of the Dhavala and the Jaya Dhavala which were enshrined in Moodbidri in South Karnataka. He was instrumental in the publication of many books on social and religious themes. He himself translated into English the *Samayasāra* and *Niyamsāra* of Acharya Kundakunda and wrote a book in Hindi entitled "Shravan-Belgoja Aur Dakshin Ke Anya Jaina Tirtha". He helped the Government in recovering as many as 80 heads of antique images broken by the smugglers in 1959 in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, which led to their arrest and sentence. He was associated with a number of social and religious institutions, viz, Delhi Society of Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Animal Friend, the All India Digamber Jain Orphanage Society as its Vice-President. The All India Digamber Jain Sangha, Vidvat Parishad, the Veer Sewa Mandir, etc, He was elected unopposed as a Municipal Councillor of Delhi Municipal Committee and as a member of the Committee appointed by the Chief Commissioner, Delhi for acceleration of private buildings. As a colonizer, he developed Daryaganj, Delhi-Shahdara, Ghaziabad, Western Extension Area and Ballabgarh etc., and was appointed as the first sole selling agent of the Delhi Improvement Trust. He constructed many buildings prominent among them being the Madhya Pradesh Assembly Hall at Bhopal, the M. P. Govt. House at Kautilya Marg and many buildings for M. E. S. at Agra and Delhi Cantt, and also for Northern Railway at Delhi Main and other places.

In order to perpetuate his memory the said Trust donated a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and about 150 books on Jain Studies to the University of Delhi, which on its part instituted Shri Raj Krishen Jain Memorial Lectures on 'Jaina Studies and Allied Topics like Ahimsa, Aparigraha, Anekanta, etc., and their Relationship to the Challenges of Our Times'. According to the stipulation, a sum of Rs. 5 000/- will be proffered annually to each speaker under this scheme who will deliver at least two lectures.

The Trust is now being managed amongst others by his only son Shri Prem Chandra Jain, and his three grandsons Shri Bharat Bhushan Jain, Advocate, Dr. Desh Bhushan Jain, and Dharam Bhushan Jain, Chartered Accountant. The Trust is carrying on many social and religious activities like actively participating in (a) the constructing of Jambu Deep at Hastinapur (the only structure in the world which will depict the whole cosmos according to the Jaina texts), (b) construction of Shrimati Krishnadevi Rajkrishen Jain Dhaval-Uddhar-Griha at Moodbidri in Karnataka to house 1500 years old palm-leaf manuscripts, idols made from emerald, etc., (c) construction of Shrimati Padmavati Premchandra Jain Library at Shravan-Belgola where stands 57 ft. high colossal statue of Bhagwan Bahubali, (d) establishment of Shri Rajkrishen Jain Shisya-Vritti in the Department of Jainology and Prakrita in Mysore University; donation of Hindi Vishwa Vidyapeeth, Wardha and so on. During the 25th Nirvan Centenary of Bhagwan Mahavira, the Trust further donated books on Jaina Studies to all the Universities of India Vasaya Samiti, Bangalore, Jains in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, etc, and also constructed for the use of the general public electrically operated automatic cold water pios at Ahimsa Mandir, Daryaganj and Hindi Park, Daryaganj, New Delhi and also donated electrically operated automatic water coolers to Boys School in Kuncha Seth and Girls School in Dharampura, Delhi. The Trust has also donated a well for the use of Saraks in village Polma (Bihar).

Kothi at 1-Daryaganj, of late Dr. M. A. Ansari where Gandhiji and other National Leaders used to stay and meetings of the Indian National Congress were held many a times and where Lord Irwin the then Vice-Roy of India came to sign an agreement with Gandhiji, had been donated to the Trust created by Shri Raj Krishen Jain in the name of Smt. Krishna Devi Raj Krishen Jain Smriti Grih. It is on about 2500 sq. yds. of land and is being used for charitable and social functions.

In 1955 Lalaji had been to Badrinath alongwith late Dr. Hira Lal Jain, Shri Yashpal Jain and Shri Vishnu Prabhakar and other persons. At that time he felt the necessity of a Jain Temple and Dharamshala at Haridwar where there was none. The U. P. Government granted to the Trust created by Lalaji about 6000 sq.ft of land where a Library, Dharmshala, Dispensary and Jain Temple are being constructed.

There was no Jain Temple at Kurukshetra another Indian Historic place where lakhs of people bathe in the holy tank at the time of *Surya-Grahaṇa* and where the famous fight took place between Kauravas and Pandavas and Yogiraj Krishna gave his sermons on which the religious book Geeta is based. The trust has got 3000 sq.yds. of land for construction of Jain Temple, Dharamshala, Library and Dispensary etc. from the Kurukshetra Development Board and construction work is in progress.

In 1959 Lalaji's second grand daughter Smt. Vijaya Jain was studying in Birla School at Pilani, a famous Educational Centre, in the country established by Birlas. He had been there and felt the necessity of Dharamshala a good Library and a Jain Temple there. The trust has been able to get land there and construction work is going to be started very soon.

The Trustees have also donated their own money at many places just like Prime Minister's Relief Fund and for other benevolent causes.

Smt. Krishna Devi Jain, wife of Shri Raj Krishen Jain died at the Historic City of Hastinapur on 27th April, 1979 where a Jambu Deep is being erected. The trust also got a chaitayalaya built in the Sumaru. She was cremated there at that time and it was felt that there was no proper place for cremation. The trustees have got constructed three Pucca Chabutras for cremation purposes there and have planted some trees and arranged for a hand tubewell.



## **BENEDICTORY ADDRESS**

*by*

**His Holiness Devendra Keerti Bhattarak Pattacharya Swamiji,  
Jaina Math Hombuja Humcha (Karnataka)**

Hon'ble Justice Rangarajan, Prof. Abad Akmad, Dr. Kalghatgi, Prof. Tiwari, Premachandraji, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is a unique occasion for us to be present during the course of lectures by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi on the Logic of Anekanta of the Jainas under the auspices of the Shri Raj Krishen Jain Memorial Lectures, in the University of Delhi. As the pontifical Head of the Jaina Math of Hombuja in Karnataka, we represent the spiritual aspect of experience. As the Chief Guest of the Meetings for the Course of Lectures we combine the secular and the spiritual spheres of experience and thought. It is said, we must give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's. It would be an ideal thing what is Caesar's and God's are harmonised. That would lead us to better understanding and better study.

Late Shri Raj Krishenji Jain was a great social worker and philanthropist. He devoted his energies for the promotion of understanding and good-will among the members of the community. He was a cementing force for the promotion of social harmony. His selfless social service in bringing many eminent Jains of Delhi together is a standing monument of his work.

We are gratified to note that his illustrious son, Shri Premachandraji Jain is continuing the noble tradition of his father. And we are sure that the next generation and the succeeding generations will enhance the prestige and the noble

work of the predecessors in the field of social work and encouragement for research. Shri Raj Krishen Jain Charitable Trust has done exceedingly well to institute Shri Raj Krishen Jain Memorial Lectures in the University of Delhi for annual lecture series on some aspect of Jaina studies in the light of the developing knowledge in other fields of study. We understand that eminent men of learning, like, Dr. D. S. Kothari, Justice T. K. Tukol, Dr. Pande and Dr. Saksena have made substantial contribution to the knowledge of Jainism and realism by the courses of lectures under this scheme.

During this session, we are indeed glad to have Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi amidst us. He has just completed the course of three lectures on Jain Logic. Dr. Kalghatgi is an eminent scholar of Jaina Philosophy and psychology. He retired as Professor and Head of the Department of 'Jainology and Prakrits' in the University of Mysore. He succeeded the sagelike scholar (like *Rishi*) Late Dr. A. N. Upadhye, for the Jainology Department.

Dr. Kalghatgi has ably presented the analytical and critical study of the very difficult topics of Jaina logic. He has given the lectures in three parts elucidating three important topics — 1. *Anekānta* and *nayavāda*, 2. *Pramāṇa* and *Nikṣepa* and 3. *Syādvāda*. He has given a studied analysis of the topics in the light of the development of thought in other fields of study. We thank him for that. Our blessings are with him.

1. Jainism is a realistic philosophy. It posits the criterion of truth which expresses the principle of correspondence. But the Jaina attitude regarding the criterion of truth, is not exclusive and dogmatic. The Principle of coherence does play an important part in the metaphysical analysis of the problems of reality. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the primacy of the *anekānta* attitude and the supraempirical forms of reality.
2. The cardinal principle Jaina philosophy can be expressed in the famous statement that the ultimate end of self—

realisation can be attained by the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. It expresses the synthesis of the triple psychological function of the cognitive, affective and the conative aspects involved in a concrete psychosis.

3. The fundamental Jaina attitude of *anekānta* has great psychological and metaphysical significance in understanding the problems of philosophy and life. *Anekānta* forbids us to be dogmatic and onesided in approach. Reality is complex. It can be looked at from various points of view. To assert that one's own point of view is right is *ekānta*. It is dogmatism. To understand that others have also point of view which needs to be respected is the spirit of *anekānta*. It is the expression of intellectual non-violence. The spirit of *anekānta* is very much necessary in society, specially in the present day, when conflicting ideologies are trying to be aggressively assertive. *Anekānta* brings the spirit of intellectual and social tolerance. *Syādvāda* is the logical expression of *anekānta* view. It presents the different points of view (*naya*) in the predication forms. It expresses the dialectic of reasoning.
4. The Jaina formulations of the seven fundamental principles the *Sapta-tattvas* – is a vindication of its realistic position. It is not merely a metaphysical scheme of principles. It presents a synthetic picture of the metaphysical, ethical and trans-ethical categories. Aristotle's categories are logical. Kant presents primarily a metaphysical, schemata of the categories with epistemological flavour. *Vaiśeṣika* categories are primarily ontological although with the addition of *Abhava* it gets the status epistemological scheme. But the Jaina concept of *Tattvas* is a synthesis of the ontological, epistemological, the ethical and the trans-ethical approach of looking at the problem of the highest reality.

5. Self-realisation is to be achieved by self-effort. There is no need of divine grace, nor is it possible to have any divine grace. Jainism looks at the world as a 'vale of soulmaking'.

We sincerely thank the Vice-Chancellor, Delhi University – Shri Premachandraji Jain and the authorities of Shri Raj Krishen Jaina Charitable Trust and the Head of the Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi for giving us this occasion to participate in the course of lectures of Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi.

May God Bless You All.

## CONGRATULATIONS & COMMENDATION

I have the pleasure and privilege to Congratulate Shri Prem Chandra Jain, Chairman, Shri Raj Krishen Jain Charitable Trust, for bringing out in print the excellent lectures of Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi on Jaina Logic. In commending these lectures as of the highest quality I am not having in consideration the fact, that they have been delivered at the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi under Shri Raj Krishen Jain Memorial Lectures on Jainism series of annual Lectures for the year. Nor am I doing so because they have been perused down by the eminent and renowned Scholar of Jaina Philosophy Dr. Kalghatgi who retired as a Professor and Head Department of Jainology, University of Mysore, Mysore. My sole consideration in doing so is the excellence with which the marvellous insights of Jaina Logic are expounded in a clear simple and graspable way for their appreciation by the discerning scholars of Indian Epistemology in general and of Jaina Logic in particular. Here is a fine feast of ideas for all those who have an interest in Indian Philosophy; wishing them all a fruitful and and purposeful reading.

Department of Buddhist Studies  
University of Delhi  
Delhi — 110007

**K. K. Mittal**  
*Head (Chairman)*

## PREFACE

"The time that my journey takes is long and the way of it is long" said Rabindranath Tagore in the *Gitanjali*.<sup>1</sup> The journey into the studies of the development of Indian thought is long and arduous. We do find that the consummation of the development of thought in the field of logic in ancient India is to be found in the doctrines of *Anekanta* and *Syadvada* in Jaina logic. The scholars in India and in the West are yet to recognise the significant contribution that the Jainas have made to logic and metaphysics.

The study of Indian Philosophy so far, is predominantly oriented towards the emphasis on the *Brahmana* course of thought. The slight recognition that the *Sramana* thought has received, and that too recently, is only casual and as appendix to the study of Vedic tradition. It is considered only as a revolt and a polemic against the ritualistic aspect of the sacrificial system. There is need today of the reorientation of the study of Indian Philosophy. This is to be based, on the clear and ungrudging recognition of the existence of the Pre-Āryan *Sramana* current of thought. Jainism represents the *Sramana* stream of thought. With a fuller perspective of the course of philosophy in India in the light of historical imagination, without pride and prejudice, we may have to recast our history of philosophy.\*

Shri Raj Krishen Charitable Trust has instituted in the University of Delhi the Course of Annual Lectures on Jainism

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1. *Gitanjali* -12.

2. Kalghatgi. (T. G.), Presidential address, as the Sectional president, 42 nd Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress 1968. Patna.

and allied thought in the light of the development of thought in the West and in India; and it is indeed a fitting contribution to the encouragement of useful research in the field of Jainism and allied subjects. Late Shri Raja Krishenji was a great visionary and social reformer. With his selfless service for the community, he sought to raise the community to the higher heights of better understanding and better life in the field of Education and community life. His services have to be remembered with gratitude. He was an ideal *Śrāvaka* who took his fellowmen on to the path of purity of life, self-dependence and towards self-realisation. His life and work are an inspiration to all of us. It is equally gratifying to note that Shri Premachandraji Jain is following the noble path laid down by his illustrious father in the pursuit and execution of the numerous philanthropic and beneficial projects for the welfare of society.

In the course of these lectures, I have attempted to present a synoptic and analytic study of the problems of Jaina logic in the light of the development of Western and Indian thought, specially with reference to the other systems of Indian thought and epistemology. In the First lecture, I have analysed the theories of *Anekānta* and *naya*. It is important for understanding the modern concepts of relativism and probability. In the Second talk I have given a brief and critical survey of the concepts of *pramāṇa* and *Nikṣepa*. The Third lecture studies the doctrine of *svādvāda* and its logical and philosophical implications. I have pointed out that Western logic has gone the way of pure formalism and abstraction without reference to concrete experiences. It is more linguistic and 'grammatic' in approach. It is calculus of logic. In this over-specialisation in the direction pure formalism, modern logic has lost the wood among the trees. It is merely the expression of one of the *nayas*, the '*śabda naya*'. Jaina theory, *Syādvāda*, in this sense, transcends formalism and presents the meta-logical analysis of thought.

I sincerely thank the authorities of the University of Delhi, Shri Premachandraji Jain of Shri Raj Krishen Charitable Trust, Dr. Mittal and Dr. Tiwary, Professor and Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi, for giving me this opportunity of presenting my study on Jain logic to the enlightened public. I am grateful to His Holiness, Shri Devendrakirti Swamiji of Jain Math Shri Kjetra Hombuja for his gracious blessings for the course of lectures.

I am grateful to Shri Rangarajan, retired judge, Delhi High Court, and Shri Shrimali Ex-Vice-Chancellor of the University of Mysore for having presided over the course of two lectures. I express my grateful appreciation for the keen interest that Dr. D. S. Kothari, Ex-Chairman, University Grants Commission has taken and for his gracious presence during the course of lectures. I have profusely drawn from the writings of Dr. D. S. Kothari on *Syadvada* and physics.

I sincerely thank M/s. Manohar Printing Press, Dharwad specially the young and enthusiastic proprietor Shri Ravi Akalwadi, for the excellent work in getting the book printed nicely, with the diacritical marks in all places.

I hope the book will promote the understanding of the implications of *Syadvada* in logic and epistemology.


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**Dr. T. G. Kelghatgi delivering Shri R. K. Jain Memorial Lecture**





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“ And *Anekanta* would give us a  
‘ Weltanschauung ’ and a scientific  
interpretation of things. ”

*Jaina View of Life*

## I

# ANEKĀNTA AND NAYAVĀDA

1. In the ancient Indian fables, there is a story of a tiger cub which was brought up by the goats. The cub grew and the care of the goats was rewarded, for the little fellow adapted his voice to their gentle way of bleating and tried to nibble blades of grass with his pointed teeth. One night, after it reached adolescence, the herd of the goats was attacked by a fierce tiger. The goats ran for life, but the cub of the tiger remained where it stood looking surprised at the tiger. The tiger took the cub to its place and gave it a piece of flesh. And taste of blood and flesh brought sudden awareness of its true nature. That was the realisation of its true nature. History of Indian thought is a picture of the continuous and constant efforts to the realisation of the true and transcendental nature of self. Knowledge of the self is the true knowledge. In the *Yajurveda* this is described as the highest knowledge. Indian

culture is a harmonious synthesis of the two currents of thought, the *Śramaṇa* and the *Brāhmaṇa*, the pre-Vedic and the Vedic currents of thought. It has, therefore, been said that the development of Indian philosophy has been a process of synthesis and assimilation of the two streams of thought. It is difficult to say to what extent and at what stage the two currents were fused into each other and into one course of philosophy. However, the two currents were blended together and what we call today as Indian culture is the crystallisation of the synthesis of the two currents of thought.

Jainism is a Śramaṇic religion. It is a pre-Aryan religion which prevailed in India long before Mahāvīra and Pārśva, the last two tirthaṅkaras<sup>1</sup>. Jacobi has made it clear that the Jaina tradition is much earlier than the Buddhist tradition and Mahāvīra is the last tirthaṅkara to carry the tradition of Jaina teaching<sup>2</sup>. Jainism has been variously referred to in the early Vedic and Buddhist literature. It was called "Arhat dharma". The Arhats believed that the self gets bound by karma and the goal of every self is to be free from the bondage of karma. This is possible by self-effort. The *Padma Purāṇa* eulogises that Arhat religion is good<sup>3</sup>. In the *Padma Purāṇa* and *Viṣṇupurāṇa* the word *Arhat dharma* is described as referring to Jaina religion. If we survey the religious literature of the time of Mahāvīra, we find that the word *nigghanta* was used for Arhat. In the *Diggha Nikāya*, Mahāvīra was described as Nigghanta Nātaputta<sup>4</sup>. In the Aśokan inscriptions, the word *nigghanta* has been used. In the Vedic literature also we find that the word Nigghanta has been used<sup>5</sup>. We find the use of "Jinaśīṣana, Jina vacana and Jina marga" in the *Daśavaikalika*

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1. Radhakrishnan (S) Indian Philosophy Vol I (Allen Unwin 1945).

2. Jacobi (4) *Sacred Books of the East* 287 XXII Introduction.

3. *Padma Purāṇa*.

4. *Diggha nikāya* — *Sāmanjasa Phalasūtra* 18, 21

5. *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka* 10. 63

sūtra<sup>6</sup>, *Uttarādhyayan*<sup>7</sup> and *Sūtrakṛāṅga*. In the *Viśeṣa-vaśyakabhāṣya* there is mention of Jina-dharma. Later references are many, for instance in the *Matsya Purāṇa*<sup>8</sup> and *Devībhāgavata*<sup>9</sup>. It is clear from this that the Jaina religion, as the expression of Śramaṇa thought was recognised by the Vedic and the Buddhist currents of thought. In the *Ṛgveda* we get references to Vātarāśanā muni<sup>10</sup>. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* gives the description of Ketu, Aruṇa and Vātarāśanā muni<sup>11</sup>. In the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, there is a description that Ṛṣabha is the promoter of the religion of the Vātarāśanā Śramaṇas.<sup>12</sup>

Jainism as an expression of Śramaṇic current of thought has made significant contribution to the development of Indian thought. It has enriched Indian philosophy in the fields of logic, epistemology, metaphysics and the way towards the ideal life of a muni and householder alike. Jainism has also contributed towards the enrichment of the development of Indian Art and architecture. The Collosal statue of Bhagavān Bahubali at Shravanabelgola is a standing monument of the heights of architectural excellence. We can restrict our study of the contribution of Jainism to Logic. The cardinal contribution in these fields can be stated to be in the presentation of the principles 1. *Anekānta* and *Syādvāda* 2. the concept of self Jīva 3. the doctrine of *Ahiṃsā* and the propagation of the practice of the *aparigraha* vrata.

6. *Daśavaikālika* 8. 25

7. *Uttarādhyayana* 36. 264

"Jinavayane anurattā Jinavayamam jē Karenti bhāveṇa"

8. *Matsyapūraṇa* 4, 13, 54

9. *Devī Bhāgavata* 4, 13, 54

"Jaina dharmā kṛtam svena, yajna ninda param tathā"

10. *Ṛgveda Samhitā* : 10, 11, 1

"Munayi vātarāśanai pīṅgā vasate matā"

11. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : 1, 21, 3, 1, 24

Ketarō Aruṇāśanā ṛṣyō vātarāśanah... ...."

12. *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* : 1, 11, 12

Jainism is a realistic and pluralistic philosophy. It is empiricist in outlook, although at the highest level it does emphasise the supremacy of the omniscient experience, *kevala jñāna* for the ultimate-experience of truth. But for the empirical knowledge we have to rely on logic and understanding.

Philosophy is not merely an academic pursuit. It is intimately connected with life. Philosophy, it is said, begins in wonder. But philosophical speculations cannot fructify at the lower level of curiosity. Hegel said philosophy makes its first expression when experience and thought have fully matured. The owl of Minerva does not start upon its flight till the evening twilight has begun to fall. Philosophy is a reflection on experience in order to comprehend the ultimate reality. As Mathew Arnold said, it is to see life steadily and to see it whole. Philosophy has had the dual function of revealing truth and increasing virtue, and philosophers have sought to provide a principle to live by and a purpose to life for

In the West, Philosophical enquiry, as academic pursuit, has proceeded in two directions :

i) The apriori rationalistic deductive methods of enquiry which were first used by *Parmenides* and his disciple *Zeno* making a distinction between sense and reason. In the middle ages philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. In Hegel and Bradley we go much further away from common sense; and we see the super structure of philosophic speculation only to gaze at the ivory tower far from the madding crowd. ii) The second course of empiricism based on inductive methods as expressed in protagorean doctrine of *Homo-Mensura*, led us to the Humean tendency which has been recently revived by the Cambridge Philosophers who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Philosophy became "Important nonsense". Philosophy, to them, is only logical analysis. It is identified with



logical syntax the higher level discussion of language. Philosophy, thus, reached a blind alley.

But, in India, we are saved from the separation of the speculative and practical, because philosophy with us is essentially spiritual. It takes its origin in life and enters back into life." In *Sankara* we are presented "with the ideal of philosophy, which is not so much of knowledge as wisdom, not so much of logical learning as spiritual freedom".<sup>14</sup> Even the *Cārvāka* had the practical aim of breaking down the ecclesiastical monopoly and still assert the spiritual independence of the individual.

In India philosophy has never been a mere academic pursuit, an intellectual gymnastic nor a luxury of the mind. It is intimately connected with life. *Mundaka Upaniṣad* speaks of *Brahma Vidyā* as the basis of all knowledge.<sup>15</sup> Philosophy in India is *Darśana* in the sense of spiritual perception. Realisation of the *Ātman* is the highest end of life. There is no other way.<sup>16</sup>

Pure speculative efforts at philosophising have led us into an impasse which we cannot escape. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood; while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees. But we should realise that these are not the only two ways nor were these approaches absolute. We have to adopt a synoptic outlook. In this sense philosophy is to see life steadily and to see it whole. Broad says, "If we do not look at the world synoptically, we shall have a narrow view of it".<sup>17</sup>

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13. Radhakrishnan (S) *Indian Philosophy* Vol. I (Allen Unwin) (1945, P. 447)

14. Ibid

15. "Sārva-vidyā Pratiṣṭhā"

16. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II, IV, 5

17. Passmore — *A hundred years of Philosophy* (1957) P. 350.

Jaina view of *anekānta* is an expression of this synoptic view of life.

*Samyug darśana Jñāna Cāritrāṇi mokṣa Mārgaḥ*

*Tattvartha Sūtra* I 1.

*Mokṣa* is the ultimate aim of life, not only for the Jainas, but for all other Indian philosophy except the *Cārvāka*. It is to be realised by the three-fold path of right understanding (*Samyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*Samyag Jñāna*) and right conduct (*Samyag-Cāritra*). The path to self-realisation is three-fold and one alone would not lead us to the goal. The harmonious blending of the three is necessary for the attainment of the highest ideal of self-realisation. Right understanding prepares the ground for right knowledge. It is the necessary mental set which helps knowledge. It expresses that *Samyagcāritra* is possible for one who has attained *Samyag-dṛṣṭi* and *Samyag-Jñāna*.

Without entering into the minor discrepancies of the *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara* versions of the essential qualities of *Samyaktva*, we may mention the characters of *Samyaktva*. *Samyaktva* (rightness) is characterised by (i) *Saṃvega* (spiritual craving), (ii) *Sama* (Stilling of the passion), (iii) *nirveda* (disgust for sense pleasure), (iv) *nindā* (remorse for the evil acts of relatives and others), (v) *bhakti* (devotion) (vi) *anukampā* (compassion) (vii) *garha* (repentence expressed in the form of *alocaṇā* made in the presence of Guru) and (viii) *Vātsalya* (loving kindness to the living). *Samyaktva* expresses itself in *niḥṣaṅkṣā* (desirelessness) *nirguhana* (absence of repugnance), *amūḍha-dṛṣṭi* (absence of perversity of attitude)<sup>18</sup>

The description of the nature of *Samyaktva* as shown above has great psychological significance. It presents the mental setting required for developing character and personality as needed for spiritual progress. The instinctive tendencies

18. Based on the analysis in the *Jaina Yoga* by R. William with slight modifications.

and emotions have to be channelised and directed by transformation and sublimation with a view to attaining mental equipoise. Ethically considered the characteristics of *Samyak-Cāritra* present a back-ground and a canvas for the illumination of one's self towards the goal of attaining perfect equanimity and spiritual strength.

The right understanding and right knowledge of the Jaina principles lead us to the study of the Jaina theory of *anekānta* which is the foundational principle of Jainism. The Jainas have made a significant contribution to Indian Logic and epistemology. The *Anekānta* view and the *Syādvāda* are the basic principles of Jaina thought. To get rid of the cycle of worldly existence was the common end of the ancient Indian Philosophers. The *Upaniṣadic* Philosophers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena. The *Buddha* denounced everything as momentary and fleeting. But *Mahāvīra* adhered to the common sense and found no contradiction between permanence and change. He was free from all dogmatism, free from all absolutism.

In surveying the field of Indian Philosophy, Dr. Padmarajah mentions five types of philosophy, considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They are :

1. Philosophy of Being — Śāṅkara represents this School of thought of identity.
2. Philosophy of Becoming (change or difference) — Buddhism presents this view.
3. Philosophy subordinating difference to identity—  
i) The Sāṅkhya, ii) Bhedābheda-vāda and iii) Viśiṣṭa-dvaita hold this attitude.
4. Philosophy subordinating identity to difference—  
i) The Vaiśeṣika, ii) Dvaita of Madhvācārya give this view.
5. Philosophy co-ordinating both identity and difference—  
The Jaina view of reality presents this attitude.

Jainism meets the extremes and presents a view of reality which comprehends the various sides of reality to give a synthetic picture of the whole. It recognises the principles of distinction and develops the comprehensive scheme of *Anekānta* realism. *Anekānta* is the 'most consistent form of realism', as it allows the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus on the theory of manifold reality and knowledge.<sup>19</sup>

*Anekānta* consists in many-sided approach to the study of problems. It emphasizes a catholic outlook towards all that we see and experience. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It arose as an antidote to the one-sided and absolute approach to the study of reality of the philosophers at that time. It arose out of the confusion of the conflicting views of the philosophers and religious men on the problem of the nature of reality. The Upaniṣadic philosophers sought to find the facts of experience.

This search gave rise to many philosophical theories. Buddhism tried to present a fresh and a different approach in the *Madhyama-pratipāda Dīṛḡi*. The *Anekānta* view presents a coherent picture of the philosophers, pointing out the important truths in each of them. It looks at the problem from various points of view. The cardinal principle of the Jaina philosophy is its *Anekānta* which emphasizes that 'there is not only diversity but that real is equally diversified'.<sup>20</sup> *Anekānta* approach to the problems of reality emphasises that reality is complex. Truth is many sided. It can be looked at from different points of view. It emphasises the catholic approach towards all that we experience. It implies that others' views have also value. It negates dogmatism and respects the others' points of view. But to look at reality from a particular point

19. Padmarajiah (Y. J.) *Jaina Theory of Reality and knowledge* (Jaina Sahitya Vikas Mandala, Bombay (1963) P. 274.

20. Mookerjee: *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism* (Bhārati Mahāvidyālaya) 1944, P. 70.

of view gives a partial view of reality. To insist that it is the whole truth is a fallacy. It is *ekanta*. It is dogmatic assertion of truth for an aspect of truth. *Anekānta* does imply the principle of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the Universe. The Jaina is a thorough-going realist. *Anekānta* is the foundational outlook of the Jainas in looking at the problems of life.

Although *Anekānta* view is the special feature of the Jaina point of view, it is possible to say that some other schools of thought were of this kind of view. In Buddhist philosophy the phrase *majjhima magga* bears the same significance as *Anekānta*. Pandit Sukhalalji Sanghvi, in his introduction to the *Sanmati Tarka*, says that the doctrine of *Anekānta* and the *madhyama mārga* have great resemblance in the fundamental idea underlying them.<sup>21</sup> *Anātmavāda* of Sanjaya, *Vibhajjavāda*, *madhyama pratipada* which induced the Buddha to treat all prevalent opinions with respect may be mentioned as expressions of *Anekānta* attitude. Similarly *Bhedābheda-vāda* of Bhartṛṣṛpanca is referred to as *Anekānta*.<sup>22</sup> Gautama, the Buddha, faced the confusion of thought presented in his time about the ultimate nature of reality. He was silent about these problems. In *Dīgha Nikāya* Gautama says "It is not that I was, I was not, it is not that I will be, I will not be; it is not that I am, I am not." The Buddha describes this attitude to Maṇavaka as *Vibhajjavāda*.<sup>23</sup> This is similar to *Anekānta*, although it is not so clearly defined and developed. No specific words suggesting the doctrine of *Anekānta* are found in the philosophic literature of ancient India. It is suggested that the doctrine of evolution as propounded by the Sāṃkhya school implies the *Anekānta* attitude.<sup>24</sup> However, the Jainas perfected the doctrine and

21. *Sanmati Tarka* ed. Introduction by Sukhalalji Sanghavi and Pandit Doshi.

22. *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra (Singh) Jaina Granthamala 1939) pp. E. L. 3.

23. *Dīghanikāya* Potthapada Sutta 9 and *Majjhima nikāya* Sutta 99

24. *Syādvāda manjarī* ed. by A. B. Dhruva Introduction.

systematized it. The Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita makes mention of the *Anekānta* of the Vipramiśsakas, Nigghantas and Kapila Sāmkhyas. Among the Jaina exponents, Mahāvira practised the attitude and is supposed to have expressed it in the *Syadvada*.

A clear expression of the *Anekānta* attitude is seen in Mahāvira's discussions with his disciples. In the *Bhagavati sūtra* there is a dialogue between the Mahāvira and his disciple Gautama.

"Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?"

"The souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some other respects . . . They are eternal, O Gautama, from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes."

Again, the problem of body and mind was answered by Mahāvira as— "The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul and non identical with the soul in different respects " "

The application of the principle of *Anekānta* can be seen in their analysis of the metaphysical question concerning the categories. The Jaina theories of atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances, illustrate the pervading influence of the *Anekānta* view-point. Atoms are of the same kind; they can yet give the infinite variety of things. *Pudgala* has certain inalienable features, but within limits it can become anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist " "

Space is another instance of a manifold real. It is uncorporeal and formless, yet divisible" " and its divisibility is a

25. *Bhagavati sūtra* VIII 17, 495 and its VII 12, 273.

26. Hiriyanna (M) *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Allen Unwin) 1931 pp. 212.

27. *Prameya Kamala mārtanḍu* · *Prabhācandra* Edt. 1948 pp. 363 and 642.

spontaneous feature. Abhayadeva develops the concepts of manifoldness of space as a polemic against the Naiyāyika view of space as one and partless. The souls are individual centres of experience. Like the Leibnizian monads the soul mirrors the entire universe within itself as a unique centre of experience. The universe it mirrors is infinitely complex; and its experimental powers must be manifold commensurate with the complexity of the experienced universe " 28.

In the Aṅga literature of the Jainas the doctrine of *Anekānta* was briefly and incidentally discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scriptures written in Prakṛit it has received greater attention. But when the Sanskrit language found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an important position. The commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti gives an exhaustive description of the problem. Later, a systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divākara, Mallavādi, Pūjyapāda, Akalalaṅka, Vidyānandi and others.

The Anekānta view does imply the principles of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as given by Kant, although this principle is more implied than expressly stated in Jainism.

In Kantianism, as in Jainism, the principle of reciprocity goes beyond the 'coexistence' or the inter-relatedness of the substances and explains the 'dynamical community' among them." But the Jaina is a thorough-going realist. *Anekantavāda* is a theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and complexity of the real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has crystallised itself into the two-fold dialectic of *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda*, and they are complementary processes

28. Padmarajah (Y. J.) *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge* pp. 283.

29. Ibid. pp. 303.

forming a normal and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics." 30

All systems of Indian philosophy, except the Cārvāka, accept the reality of the Ātman as a spiritual entity. The Buddhist, however, maintains that the entity called the soul is only an aggregate of the fleeting states. (*skhanda*). It is a continuity of the stream of mental and physical states, *Namarūpa* without any nucleus or identity, It is *santāna*. For the Vedantin, the *Brahman* is pure consciousness and is the Absolute reality and the supreme truth. The quality of knowing does not constitute the nature of the *Brahman*, for the *Brahman* is above these limitations. The function of consciousness is associated with *antaḥkaraṇa*. The *Brahman* is the pure form bereft of duality of the knower and the known. In the Sāṃkhya system *Puruṣa* is of the nature of consciousness (*cetanā*). Intelligence is not innate to *Puruṣa* but the evolute of *prakṛti*. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems regard *jñāna* as an independent category though the soul is the substratum. According to Nyāya, knowledge is an attribute of the soul and that too, not an essential attribute. As we have seen, the Buddhists propound the beginningless stream of consciousness (*citta*) which takes the form of *ālavavijnāna* and *pravṛtti-vijnāna*. There is no permanent substance serving as the matrix of the process. Jainism maintains that modes (*paryāya*) of substance – *utpāda* (origination), *vyāya* (destruction), and *Dhrouvya* (subsistence) are equally real, from the *vyavahara naya* (empirical point of view). Every object, whether it is material or not, is amenable to these conditions. It undergoes these changes maintaining at the same time the permanent nature. The intrinsic nature itself does not change to the extent of self-destruction nor does it ever remain stationery – *kuṣasthanitya* as mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*. The Ātman that undergoes these changes is of the nature of psychic energy, home of

30 Upadhye (A. N.) *Pravacansāra of Kundakundīcārya* Edt. (Bombay 1935 Introduction)



McDougall, *upayoga*. In fact, knowledge is innate and inherent in the soul. The Ātman is knowledge and knowledge is Ātman. The Ātman is of the nature of *anantacatuṣṭaya* and *jnāna* is one of them. From the stand point of pure consciousness, knowledge (*jnāna*) is a modification (*Paryaya*) but is *Guṇa* (attribute) also since it has its own modifications.

*Anekāntavāda* seeks to find out a solution out of this intellectual chaos. It seeks to find meaning in the diversity of opinions and tries to establish that these diverse views are neither completely false nor completely true. They present partial truths from different points of view. The *anekānta* seeks to determine the extent of reality present in different schools of thought and gives a synoptic picture of reality. The eminent Ācāryas like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka and Hari-bhadra have presented the subtle logical distinctions and the metaphysical thoughts involving unity and diversity, the oneness and duality and other forms of philosophy on the basis of *anekānta*. A comprehensive picture of reality is sought to be presented by the theory of *anekānta*.

And for this reason the theory of *anekānta* has become foundational for Jaina thought. In fact, the *anekānta* outlook is the basis for other schools of Indian thought. The Jaina Ācāryas have presented a synoptic outlook in understanding the problems of philosophy on the basis of *anekānta*. They say that *ekānta* or dogmatism or one sided approach to the problems of reality is not inherent in reality (*vastuśatadharma*). But it is due to discursive thought. It is the product of intellectual discrimination. If understanding is pure in its essence, then *ekānta* will disappear. The pure exercise of understanding will give rise to a synoptic view point expressed in the *anekānta* and the different partial view points get merged in the *anekānta*, just as the different rivers get merged in the sea.<sup>31</sup>

31. *Siddhasena*: as quoted by Devendra Muni Sastry in *Jaina Darśana-Svarūpa Aur Vilepaga* (Taraka Guru Jaina Granthamala, Udaipur 39) pp. 234.

Upadhyaya Yasovijaya says that one who has developed the *anekanta* outlook does not dislike other view points. He looks at other view points with understanding and sympathy, just as the father looks at the activities of the son. One who believes in the *anekanta* outlook looks at the conflicting and diverse theories of realities with equal respect. He does not look at the diverse theories of realities as one superior to the other. He has the spirit of equanimity in approaching the understanding of the problems of other theories. In the absense of the spirit of equanimity all knowledge would be fruitless. And any amount of reading the sacred texts would not lead to any fruitful results. <sup>32</sup>

One who develops the *ekanta* attitude and insists on his point of view is one sided in his approach and would like to lead others also to his points of view. But the one who develops the synoptic outlook based on the *anekanta* attitude is always guided by objective and rational considerations in evaluating the theories of reality.

*Anekanta* states that the nature of reality should be considered and studied purely from the rational point of view without prejudice or bias. The *ekanta* attitude is compelling and it drives us to accept its point of view and discourages us to accept the others' points of view

A milk-maid churns the butter milk, and while churning buttermilk she pulls the string on the one side and loosens the string on the other. The consequence is butter is extracted from the butter milk. Similarly if we look at the different points of view of knowing reality in their proper perspective, considering the primary points of view as important and the secondary points of view with their due consideration, truth can be understood in the form of perspective and in a comprehen-

32. Yasovijaya ' *Jñāna sāra* ' as quoted in Devendra Muni Sastry- pp. 235. *Jaina Darśana-Svarūpa Aur Viśleṣaṇa* (Taraka Guru Jaina Granthamala, Udaipur 39)

sive way. The intellectual confusion is created by *ekānta* while the cobwebs of confusion are cleared by *anekānta*. The synoptic outlook of *anekānta* gives a comprehensive and true picture of reality.

*Anekānta* emphasises that truth is manysided. Reality is of the nature of *anantadharma*. Reality is complex like the many coloured dome. It can be looked at from different points of view.

*Anekānta* emphasizes that the truth is manysided. Reality can be looked at from various angles. Two doctrines result from the *Anekāntavāda*: i) *Nayavāda* and ii) *Syādvāda*. *Nayavāda* is the analytic method of investigating a particular stand-point of factual situation. *Syādvāda* is primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the different view-points arrived at by *Nayavāda*. *Nayavāda* is 'primarily conceptual' and the *Syādvāda* is synthetic and mainly verbal, although it is sometimes maintained that conceptual is also verbal and the verbal method is so much changed with epistemological characters. The distinction between the conceptual and the verbal has mainly a reference to the fact that points of view have to be expressed in language and predicated in specific forms so as to embody them. The concept is formed from this point of view.

*Naya* refers to the point of view one takes when one looks at the object. A *naya* is defined as a particular opinion or a view-point of looking at an object. It expresses a partial truth about an object as known by a knowing subject.<sup>33</sup> The Jainas give the example of the blind men and the elephant. The blind men feel the animal and describe it, each in his own way. Similarly, we look at objects and describe them in our own way from different angles. Other view-points are also recognised; and they need to be recognised with each in the scheme of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of *Pramāṇa*.

33. *Prameyacakamalamārtanḍa* of Prabhācandra. "Anirākṣatapretipakṣavastavasamgrahaḥ jñāturbhiprāya nayaḥ".

The Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. There was a problem whether the seven *Nayas* can be reduced in number. There are three traditions. The first tradition adopts seven *Nayas*. The second eliminates *Naigama Naya* and reduces the list to six. In the third tradition we have five, as *Samabhirūḍha* and *Evambhūta Naya* have been subsumed under *Śabda Naya*. Umāsvāti is largely responsible for the first and the third traditions. In the Digambara version of the *Tattvarthasūtra* seven ways have been mentioned, but the Śvetāmbara version gives five *Nayas* as mentioned in the third tradition.<sup>34</sup> The different points of view are the *Nayas*. Various *Nayas* have been mentioned. As shown above, Umāsvāti first mentions five *Nayas* and then adds the subdivisions.<sup>35</sup> The Āgamas have mentioned two points of view : i) *Samgraha Naya*, the point of view of the universal, the synthetic point of view and ii) *Paryāyika Naya*, the view-point of the particular, the analytic point of view. Siddhasena Divākara in his *Sanmati Tarka* adopted the two points of view and distributed the *Nayas* under two heads. He described the six *Nayas*. But the generally accepted classification of *Nayas* is seven fold. Three of them refer to objects and their meaning, and the others to the words. In the first category we get three : i) *Samgraha Naya*, ii) *Vyavahāra Naya*, and iii) *Rjjuṣṭra Naya*. Siddhasena Divākara says that *Samgraha* and *Vyavahāra* are subdivisions of the *Dravyarthika Naya*.<sup>36</sup> *Samgraha Naya* gives the synthetic point of view. It gives, as Radhakrishnan points out, the class point of view. In this, we seek to approach the unity amidst the diversity by finding the common element in the variety presented in the world. Absolute monism is the conclusion of this point of view. Exaggerated emphasis on the universal would lead to *Samgrahabhāsa*; and Sāṃkhya and Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances.<sup>37</sup> The

34 Padmarajiah (Y. J.)- *Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge* pp 325.

35 *Tattvarthadhigamasūtra* L. 34, 35

36 *Sanmati tarka* Ch. I verse 3, 4

37 *Pramāṇa-tattva-lokālankāra*

absolute emphasis on the One and unity dismissing all diversity as appearance, is the position of the absolutists. The Jains maintain that such a point of view, if it is taken in the absolute sense, presents a partial point of view.

The comprehension of all the attributes and modes is not possible by ordinary reason, discursive thought. Only the omniscient (*kevalin*) can have such comprehension. The ordinary cogniser may have the various modes of apprehension due to his limitations in understanding arising out of mental inadequacies, like prejudices and other psychic impediments, which the Jaina Ācāryas would refer to as *Jñānavarāṇīya Karma*. The modes of apprehension arising out of these limitations are called *Naya*.<sup>38</sup>

Akalanka defines *naya* "*Jñātṛṇām abhisandhayati khalu navaḥ dravyaparyāyataḥ*."<sup>39</sup>

The mode of apprehension which looks at the object from the point of view of the universal is *dravyārthika naya*, and the approach to the problem from the point of view of the particulars gives the *Paryāyārthika naya*. *Dravyārthika naya* in its pure form is only concerned with the simple statement 'It is'. It refers to general statements. However, there is overlapping of the two *nayas*, and it is impossible to find the *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika* *nayas* in their pure forms. There cannot be any general without the particular nor can there be any particular without the general implying or containing it. However, when a particular statement is said to be stated from the *dravyārthika* or from the *paryāyārthika naya*, it only means either of the aspects is given prominence in the statement. But these *nayas* cannot be taken in their isolation; that would give a false *naya* a fallacy of *naya* – *nayavbhāsa*. There cannot be a thing devoid of modification like changes birth and decay (*utpada* and *vyaya*) on the other hand, modifications

38. *Siddhivinīṣaya Tīkā* Edt. Mahendra Kumar Jain introduction pp. 113 (Bharatiya Jaina Pīṭha, Kashi, 1944).

39. *Siddhivinīṣaya* : Akalanka X 1.

cannot be expressed in the absence of the substance (*Dravya*) undergoing the modifications. All the three are equally real. We have discussed this earlier.<sup>40</sup> *Dravyāsthika* and *Paryāyārthika* have been sometimes referred to as *Dravyāsthika* and *Pryayāsthika*. *Tattvartha-vartikā* has made a similar subtle distinction.<sup>41</sup> Another distinction *paramārtha* (the higher) and the *vyavahāra* (phenomenal, the lower) has also been introduced. *Dravyāsthika* refers to *dravya*, a thing or an entity in its noumenal real or substantial form (*ekadravya*), thereby emphasising the concept of *abedha* (non-difference or non-distinction). *Vyavahāra* has reference to the modes of an entity so opting the implication of existence of *dravya* as its basis. This refers to the pluralistic and empiricist approach and not the non-dualist outlook. This distinction has been referred to as *Paramārtha*. *Paryāyārthika* (ultimate modes point of view), because it is directly connected with the understanding of the nature of a thing in its substance as expressing modifications but without reference to the similar things due to the resemblance (*Sādṛśya*), the non-distinction (*abhedha*). But *Vyavahāra dravyārthika* and *Vyavahāra-paryāyāsthika* have reference to the substantiality or modifications, identity or difference (*bhedha* or *abhedha*) between numerous entities.<sup>42</sup> In our empirical experience, we have 3 aspects ; 1) Cognition of an object (*jñāna*), ii) comprehension or grasping of the meaning (*artha*) and iii) communication of knowledge to others through the medium of language (*śabda*). The emphasis on these aspects gives rise to the distinction of the forms of the *naya*— 1) *Jñāna naya*, ii) *Artha naya*, and iii) *Śabda naya*. In some cases, cognition will suffice without the need of analysing the meaning and the need of communication. In some cases the meaning has to be understood and explained, while sometimes it needs to be communicated.

40. *Sanmati Prakaraṇa* – Siddhasena Diwakar 5, 12 Gathas

41. *Tattvartha Vartika* - 1, 33

42. *Siddhivinīṣaya Tīkā* ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain (Bharatiya Jaina Pīṭha, Kashi, 1944) Hindi Introduction. pp. 143.

*Vyavahāra Naya* is the empirical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It emphasises the diversity in the universe presented in the experience. We know things in their details and emphasize their individuality. The attitude of the pluralists and the materialists is the outcome of the view.

*Rjusutra Naya* is narrower than the *Vyavahāra Naya*. It looks at an object at a particular point of time, and does not see the continuity of the thing. The Jainas say that the Buddhist philosophy of *Kṣāṇikavāda* is an example of the *Rjusutra Naya*. It is *nayābhāsa*.

*Naigama Naya* refers to the end or the purpose involved in the action. We interpret an activity with reference to the end for which it is done. For instance, a man who is carrying water and firewood will say that he is cooking if he is asked what he is doing. Siddhasena Divakara adopts a different point of view. *Naigama Naya* comprehends both the generic and specific qualities.

Another interpretation of *Naigama Naya* involves non-discrimination between the generic and the specific elements of an object. For example, when we state "The Bamboo grows here in plenty" the generic and the specific features of the bamboo are not within the focus of our attention. The principle of configuration and the Gestalt suggested by Gestalt School of Psychology holds good in this case<sup>43</sup>.

The non-distinction is not, however, absolute and if the distinction is asserted absolutely there would be a fallacy of *Naigamābhāsa*.

Akalanka says that *Naigama naya* looks at *Dharma* and *dharmi* (a thing and its attribute) from the primary and the secondary emphasis according to the universe of discourse. For instance when we refer to *Jiva*, we give emphasis on substance

43. Padmarajah (V. J.) *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*. pp. 315.

and secondary importance to the modes and characteristics like that of knowledge (*jñāna*) etc. But when we say *Jñānavan jīva*, we give primary importance to the knowledge as the characteristic of *jīva* and the substantiality of *jīva* goes to the background. In these statements both aspects have reference, one is primary and the other secondary<sup>44</sup>. The function of *naigama naya* is to give emphasis, primary emphasis or secondary, on substance and its attributes or modes in the different statements according to the intention of the speaker in different universes of discourse<sup>45</sup>. The function of *Naigama naya* is to point out that not any particular *naya* is to be exclusively adhered to in the understanding of an object<sup>46</sup>.

Akalanka has given the analytical distinction of the fallacies of *naigama naya*. They are *naigamābhāsa*. To emphasise the absolute distinction as also the absolute non-distinction between a thing and its modes, the agent and action and general and particular leads to *naigamābhāsa*. As we have seen earlier, the Vaiśeṣika approach to emphasise the exclusive distinction between a thing and its attributes is a fallacy of *naigama naya-naigamābhāsa*. The *Sāṃkhya* contention that knowledge is not inherent in the self but is a product of *Prakṛti* is also *naigamābhāsa*<sup>47</sup>.

*Saṃgraha naya* gives prominence to the universal in the midst of particulars<sup>48</sup>. The particulars are intellectually woven together and *Saṃgraha* gleans out the general through the particulars. The concept of man is universal arising out of the observation of the particular numerous men, due to the similarities among them (*sādṛśa*). To glean out the concept of

44. *Laghiyastraya* - 39.

45. *Tattvārtha Śloka Vārtikā* (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay) pp. 269.

46. a) *Dhavalā tika Suparāpāṇa* as referred to by Mahendra Kumar Jain in his Introduction (Amedi) to *Siddhivinīṣaya - tika* pp 144.

b) *Laghiyastraya* . 39

47. *Siddhivinīṣaya* . 10, 10, 10, 11.

48. *Ibid* . 10, 13.



substance from the particular modes is the expression of *saṃgraha naya*. Distinction has been drawn between it *para-saṃgraha* and ii) *apara saṃgraha naya*. *Parasaṃgraha* aims at finding out the common characteristics in particular similar objects on the basis of resemblances in particular aspects, as in the case of arriving at the concept of man by observing particular men. Similarly we bring together all cows in the concept of the universal cow. In the *aparasamgrah* the universal is primary. By *para-saṃgraha*, we are to class together *jiva* and *ajiva* as *dravya*. From the *Saṃgraha* point of view, we are led to the concept of the universal embracing the particular instances of similar nature and the consummation of the exclusive emphasis of the *saṃgraha naya*, will lead us to the concept of the Absolute. *Sat*, the Absolute has no distinction between the *cetanā* and *acetanā*<sup>49</sup>. On the basis of this way of thinking, we are sometimes led to the conclusion of the exclusive emphasis of Truth as one and not many. The reality of the particular is denied, as in the case of the Advaita concept of the *Brahman*. This is *saṃgrahābhāsa*, because, according to this view, particulars, plurality and diversity are denied. The world of multiplicity is an appearance.<sup>50</sup> But *Saṃgraha naya* does not deny the reality of particulars, although emphasis is given on the universal. And the function of *saṃgraha naya* is to point out the unity in diversity altogether.

*Vyavahāranaya* is analytic and empirical distinctions are emphasised on particulars referring out of the general. The plurality of particular is equally real, they lead to the concept of unity and universality. The emphasis, here, is on the particulars without denying the unity and universality underlying the particulars.<sup>51</sup> The exclusive emphasis on particulars denying the reality of the universals is the fallacy of *Vyavahāranaya* – *Vyavahāranayabhāsa*. For instance, Sautrāntika School of

49. *Tattvārtha bhāṣya* : 1, 35. 'Sarvamekaṃ Sadavideśāt'.

50. *Siddhiviniśaya* : 10, 17 and 18.

51. *Sarvārtha Siddhi* : 1, 33

Buddhism emphasises the reality of the particulars in the *Sarvāstivāda* Yogācāra school gives prominence to the units of consciousness and it leads to *Ālayavijñāna*. This is also an expression of *Vyavahāranayābhāsa*.

*Paryāyarthika Naya* is the analytic point of view, referring to the words and their meaning. It is a verbal interpretation of the terms used. It has three subdivisions : i) *Śabda Naya*, ii) *Samabhirūḍha Naya*, and iii) *Evambhūta Naya*. *Śabda Naya* consists in looking at the functional importance of the terms. The name has a function calling to our mind the object implied by the name. However, we very often forget that the meaning of a term is relative and it varies with different context. We emphasize that the meaning is fixed. That gives rise to fallacies. *Samabhirūḍha Naya* is the application of the *Śabda Naya*. It refers to the roots of words. For instance, *rāja* as a person who shines is different from the *nṛpa*, a person who rules over men and protects them. *Evambhūta* not only sees the difference between words with their different etymologies; but it sees the difference between one and the same word, if it does not signify the meaning denoted by the root in the word. For instance, there is a difference between *rāja* when he is shining and *rāja* when he is not shining. In this we give a word a fixed meaning, somethings by usage. For instance, a nut' has come to mean in English a showy man.

The Cambridge philosophers and analytic school of philosophy in the present day assert the exclusive application of the form of *Paryāya Naya* to express *Śabda-nayābhāsa*.

In *Evambhūta Naya* we restrict the meaning of the word to the very function connoted by the name. It is a specialised form of the *Samabhirūḍha*. For instance, a building will be called a house as long as it is used for residential purposes. But if it is used for office purposes, it will not be appropriate to call it a house.

*Śabda naya* has reference to the meaning of the word in the context of *kāla* (time), ii) *karaka* (agent), iii) *linga* (gender),

and iv) *samkhyā* (number). It points out that the meaning of the words is not eternally fixed. It has shades of differences on the bases of the contextual references as mentioned above. And not to recognise the distinction of the meaning implied in the word due to contextual differences would lead us to the fallacy *Sabda naya* called *Sabdanayabhāsa*. This distinction is based on the *Anekānta* approach to the understanding of the nature of things and words implying them. For this reason Ācārya Pūjyapāda has started the *Jainendraṣṭavyākaraṇa* with the words "*Siddhiranekāntat*". And Ācārya Hemacandra has begun the *Haimaṭabdanuśasana* with the words "*Siddhisyaadvādat*"<sup>52</sup>.

The object of *evambhūta naya* is to restrict the meaning of the word to its present function<sup>53</sup>. For instance, the name Indra would be meaningful at the time when he actually rules. The name pūjari would have significance when he is actually worshipping. The judge would be called by that name when he sits on the seat of justice. But to continue to apply that name at all other times would be *nayabhāsa* of this *naya*.

Thus, each *Naya* or point of view represents one of the many ways from which a thing can be looked at. The *Nayas* remind us that our points of view looking at the things are relative, and over-emphasis on one point of view as absolute and the only point of view would be a mistake. It would give an *abhāsa*, or appearance of truth only. It gives rise to the wrong point of view. According to the Jainas, Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Advaita Vedānta and the Buddhist systems adopt one of the *Nayas*; but they believe that their point of view is absolute and unerring. However, they present only partial truths. The Jainas point out that the controversy regarding causation presenting different views like the *asatkāryavāda* and the *satkāryavāda*, are one-sided and partial. But an object can be described in different ways. For instance, a gold necklace

52. As mentioned in *Siddhivinīṭcaya* Tikā ed., by Mahendra Kumar Jain introduction (Hindi) pp. 148

53. *Siddhivinīṭcaya* : 11, 31 "Evambhūta nayaḥ Kriyārtha vacanaḥ".

will be gold if we consider the substance out of which it is made; but if it is looked at from the point of view of the modifications, it may be described differently. Similarly, each *Naya* has a different extent. *Naigama Naya* has the greatest, and the *Evambhūta Naya* the least extent. *Naigama* deals with the reals and the unreal, *Samgraha* with the real. *Vyavahara* deals with part of the real. *Rjusūta* refers to the present condition of the real, and *Sabda* only to the expression of the real. *Samabhirūḍha* has a reference to the particular expression, *Evambhūta* applies to the present activity.

So far have analysed the conceptual content and the logical implications of the different *nayas*. The metaphysical implication of the concept of *naya* is equally important. From the metaphysical point of view *naya* can be distinguished into two forms: (1) *Niścaya naya* and (2) *Vyavahāra naya*. *Niścaya naya* is the ultimate noumenal point of view, while *Vyavahāra-naya* is the practical phenomenal point of view<sup>54</sup>. *Niścaya naya* grasps reality in its ultimate aspect, while *Vyavahāra-naya* is practical in its approach. It attempts to understand the phenomenal nature of reality.

In the Jaina Āgamic literature there is the distinction between *Niścaya* and *Vyavahāra naya* whose functions are to look at reality from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. The Buddhist mentions the "*Paramārtha and Samvṛtta*" points of view. The *Upaniṣads* mention the *Sthūla* and *Sūkṣma dr̥ṣṭi*. Jainas look at reality from the *Niścaya naya* in order to find out the real nature of the object with reference to its substance and not so much with reference to its modes, although the consideration of the modes is secondary.

*Acārya Kundakunda* has given prominence to the distinctions between *Niścaya naya* and *Vyavahāra naya*. They are both complementary to each other; both are necessary for the full understanding of the nature of reality. He has given

54. *Samayasāra*. I.

elaborate interpretation of the application of the concept of *naya* to the various problems of logic and philosophy. Ācārya Kundakunda's emphasis on the distinction between *Nīścaya* and *Vyavahāra naya* is his special contribution. This distinction has a psychological content. The approach to the understanding of the nature of things depends on the capacity of the individual to grasp the nature of thing. In the *Samayasāra*<sup>55</sup> Kundakunda explains that it is necessary to present the nature of reality to different individuals from different angles according to the capacity of the individuals to understand the nature of things. For some it would be sufficient to present abstract principles. But for others, whose ability is less, it would be necessary to explain in allegoric and pictorial language. For the common man the metaphysical principles have to be explained in empirical terms.

Ācārya Kundakunda has thus presented the distinction between the metaphysical and practical approaches to the problems of philosophy. He has interpreted the concepts of *Jīva*, *Samyaktva*, *Upavoga* and the concepts of theory of knowledge from the *Nīścaya* and *Vyavahāra-naya*. For instance, while analysing the distinction of the concept of *naya* from the practical and the noumenal points of view, he mentions that *Subha* and *Asubha Upayoga* are concerned with presenting the problems of the worldly conduct, while *Suddha Upayoga* is the characteristic of the pure and perfect soul.<sup>56</sup>

Ācārya Kundakunda has given a graphic description of the spiritual craving, hunger and thirst after righteousness (*ādhyātma bhavana*). *Ādhyātma bhavana* is the craving for self-realisation and the purification of the self (*Śuddhātma prāpti*). In this sense, he describes *nīścaya naya* as *bhūtārtha* and *Vyavahāra naya* as *abhūtārtha*.<sup>57</sup> And in this description, he has given supreme importance to *nīścaya naya*. But, for understanding

55. *Samayasāra-I*

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Samaya prabhīta* : 13.

the empirical phenomena one has to take recourse to other *nayas*. In this sense, *Pravacanasāra* and *Pancastikayasāra* have given elaborate study of the fundamentals of Jaina metaphysics.

It would be apter to say that the understanding of the principles of *naya* and the right interpretation of the doctrine of *naya* is the greatest need for getting the right perspective of jaina philosophy

In the *Dhavalā*, it has been suggested that the *muni* who has the right understanding of the principle of *naya* has the right knowledge of the higher philosophy<sup>58</sup>

The modern Western Philosophers come very near the concept of *naya* and its complexity when they discuss the problems of relations in logic and the relational way of thought. This need not, however, be confused with Relational inference as when we argue: A is the friend of B. B is the friend of C. Therefore, A is the friend of C. This would involve fallacious reasoning in relational thought. Such relational arguments are not always valid. The validity of the argument depends on facts of experience. *Anekānta* and *nayavāda* do not at all subscribe to such fallacious reasoning.

Stebbing says that all deduction depends upon the logical properties of relations. Individuals in the universe are not isolated; they stand in various relations. Physical objects stand in spatial and gravitational relations. Human beings are related in numerous ways e g by Kinship by enmity or by friendship, by precedence<sup>59</sup>.

Relation is said to hold or fail of given terms. When R holds from X to Y, then there is some relation which holds from

58. *Dhavalā* I 1 Gatha 60

"Natthi naehiṃ vihūṇaṃ suttam atthovva jīṇavaramadamuṃḥi .  
To Nayavāde pivuṇā muṇiṇo Siddhantiyānonti"

59. Stebbing (Susan L.) *A Modern Elementary Logic* (Mathuen London 1957) pp. 80.

Y to X. The converse of R (relation) may be symbolised as R. XRY is always equivalent to YRX. The converse of R is some time written as R, as in the *Principia Mathematica* by Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead<sup>60</sup>.

Relation has a direction. The properties of symmetry and transitivity are the bases of classification of relations as;

1. Symmetrical transitive—equal to
2. Symmetrical intransitive— spouse of; twine of
3. Asymmetrical transitive— Ancestor of, greater than or before;
4. Asymmetrical intransitive— Father of, greater by two than, grand child of.

The relational arguments, in which the relation is symmetrical, are all of the nature of :  $A=B$ ;  $B=C$  ∴  $A=C$ .

In these cases the validity of the argument depends upon the fact that the relating relation is transitive.<sup>61</sup>

The study of relational thinking given by Modern Logic is based on deductive reasoning and linguistic analysis. It is primarily concerned with the analysis of the meaning of the words and propositions. Western Formal Logic stands isolated and is unrelated to psychological basis of thinking and communication. If Modern Western Logic were to take the perspective of experience with reference to concrete situations in relation to epistemological and psychological analysis, it would come nearer to the Jaina view of *naya*. The Jaina doctrine of *naya* looks at the problem with the totality of experience in its psychological aspects.

Professor A. C. Ewing, while discussing the need for philosophical analysis, points out that it would be an error to

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60. Ibid.

61. Stebbing (Susan L.) . *A Modern Introduction of Logic* : (Mathuen 1930) pp. 112, 114.

hold that everything which can be said is either perfectly clear or non-sense; or that everything can be made perfectly clear. But, we must try to make as clear as possible without doing violence to the facts. Analysis is necessary atleast as a propaedeutic to philosophy<sup>62</sup>. The doctrine of *naya* would have greater impact on Modern Logic if it is studied in the right perspective.

In the *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*, Siddhesena Diwakara says that a wise speaker sometimes places before his audience even one of the two *nayas* (*Dravyarthika* and *Paryāyarthika*) having regard to the mental level of the persons listening to him<sup>63</sup>.

As the salt gives taste to all sorts of cooking, so the *nayacakra* purifies all the *śāstras*<sup>64</sup>.

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62 Philosophical Studies Essays in Memory of L. Susan Stebbing (Allen Unwin 1948)– pp 84 Philosophical Analysis by A. C. Ewing

63. *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*– I. 54

64. *Nayacakra - Dravyasvabhāva Gāthā* 417 as quoted in *Atmadharma* August 1981 pp. 5

"Lavaṇam va lṇam bhaṇīyam nayacakkam Sayalasatthasuddhiyaram I  
Sammā vi ya sua micchā jivāṇam Suṇayamaggarahiyaṇam II.



## II

# PRAMĀNA AND NIKSEPA

**Pramāṇa :**

The Jainas have developed a systematic theory of Logic. They have made significant contribution to *Pramāṇa Śāstra*.

*Upayoga* is the essential characteristic of the self. Ācārya Umasvāti says that *Upayoga* is the inherent and essential characteristic of the soul<sup>65</sup>. *Upayoga* has conative prominence. In my book – *Some problems in Jaina Psychology*<sup>66</sup> I have suggested that the concept of *Upayoga* is the anticipation of the concept of *Horme*, a psychophysical energy; purposive, which is responsible for our getting experience. The hormic force determines experience and behaviour. William McDougall has

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65 *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*-II. 8.

66 Kaighatgi (T. G.) *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology* (Karnataka University, Dharwad, 1961) Chapter-III.

given emphasis on the hormic energy for experience<sup>67</sup>. *Jñāna* and *darśana* spring from *Upayoga*<sup>68</sup>. Kundakundacārya distinguishes *Jñāna* and *darśana* from the empirical and transcendental points of view. *Ātman*, its *jñāna* (knowledge) and *darśana* (intuition) are identical and they reveal the self and not-self<sup>69</sup>. Ācārya Virasena, in his commentary called *Dhavalā* on *Śaṣṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta says "What comprehends an eternal object of the nature of the universal and particular is *jñāna* and comprehension of the self of the same nature is *darśana*<sup>70</sup>.

Knowledge is inherent in the self. But, the relation need not be construed as the relation between substance and attribute in terms of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. From the practical point of view, we may distinguish between self and knowledge to say that self has knowledge. But from the noumenal point of view (*niscaya naya*) there is no distinction between knowledge and self<sup>71</sup>.

Knowledge is self-illuminative and it also illumines the object of knowledge (*svapara prakāśaka*) Cognition cognises itself and also illumines other objects, just as the lamp illumines the objects around it and illumines itself. In the Āgama literature the characteristics of knowledge have been presented from the points of view of identity and difference (*abheda* and *bheda*). From the point of view of identity the self and knowledge are identical. From the point of view of difference the self has a quality of knowledge. From the point of view of identity and difference the self can be said to be neither completely different nor completely identical. This is because know-

67 McDougall (William) *An Outline of Psychology* (Mathuen 1948) Chapter-III

68 *Prajñāpanā* . 29-30

69. *Niyamasāra* 170

70 Ācārya Virasena : *Dhavalā* in *Śaṣṭkhaṇḍāgama*

"Sāmāna Viśeṣātmaka Bāhyārtha Grahaṇam Jñānam,

Tādātmaka Svarūpa Grahaṇam Darśanam itī Siddham".

71 *Samayasāra* 7

ledge is the quality of the self and also because the object of knowledge is related to the knowledge as of external relation.

The theory of knowledge in the Āgamas is very ancient. In the *Rājaprasānīyasūtra*, Keśikumāra explains to Śramaṇa Rājapradesi, the theory of knowledge as presented in the Āgamas. Keśikumāra belongs to the Pārśvanātha tradition. Keśikumāra explains the classification of knowledge into five types according to the Pārśvanātha tradition :

1. *abhinibhodikajñāna* (sense experience)
2. *śrutajñāna* (indirect knowledge)
3. *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance)
4. *manahparyāyajñāna* (telepathy)
5. *kevalajñāna* (omniscience)<sup>72</sup>

In the *Uttarādhyāyana sūtra* there is a dialogue between Keśikumāra and Gautama<sup>73</sup>. From this it is clear that there was no difference between the Pārśva and Mahāvīra traditions regarding the nature and the types of knowledge. Similarly the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions accept the distinction of five types of knowledge, although there seems to be some difference of opinion regarding the nature of *Kevalajñāna*.

From the point of view of the development of the theory of knowledge and on the basis of the Āgamic theory of knowledge, we can distinguish three different stand-points regarding the nature and types of knowledge<sup>74</sup>. The first stand-point accepts the Āgamic classification of five types of knowledge. It also accepts the distinction of the four stages in the *abhinibhodikajñāna* like, (1) *avagṛha*, (2) *ihā*, (3) *avāya* and (4) *dharāṇa*.<sup>75</sup> The second stand-point makes a distinction in knowledge into—

72. *Rājaprasānīya sūtra* 165.

73. *Uttarādhyāyana* . 23

74. Pandit Dilsukh Malvania . *Āgama Yuga ke Jaina Darabana* (Hindi) pp. 317

75. *Bhagavatī* . 88, 317.

(1) *Pratyakṣa* (direct), (2) *Parokṣa* (indirect) with its subdivisions. In this tradition sense knowledge is not direct, because sense-organs are impediments to the direct cognition by the self. The soul is obstructed from getting direct cognition in this type of experience. Knowledge that soul gets directly without the help of the sense organs is direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). *Sthānāṅga* clearly makes these distinctions.<sup>76</sup>

The third stand-point has brought about a slight modification in the classification of knowledge. This classification distinguishes *matijñāna* (sense experience) into two types as *pratyakṣa* (direct) due to sense organs and *parokṣa* (indirect) due to the mind. This tradition takes into consideration the views of other Indian philosophers. With a view to avoiding ambiguity and confusion, they have designated the sense experience (*matijñāna*) also as *pratyakṣa*. There are two types of *pratyakṣa* (1) *Samvyavahārika pratyakṣa*. It is *matijñāna* or sense experience. (2) *Nija pratyakṣa* which the self gets without the help of the sense organs. The forms of this *pratyakṣa* are *avadhi*, *manahparyaya* and *kevala*. From the point of view of the purity and certainty of knowledge there is a graduated excellence from the *matijñāna* to *kevalajñāna*. Knowledge obtained through mind only is *parokṣajñāna*. These stages of the knowledge have been scientifically analysed by later Ācāryas. The mental states like memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) have been defined with reference to the metaphysical implications. But such analysis of the mental states like *smaraṇa* and *pratyabhijñā* in metaphysical overtones need not be adequate explanations about the nature of these mental states. In the Āgamic literature there was not much of logical and metaphysical disputation about these problems. But later logicians had to compete with other scholars belonging to different *darśanas*. Therefore, they effected modifications in the classifications of knowledge.

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76. *Sthānāṅga*.

This brief introduction of the Jaina concept of knowledge was necessary for understanding the problems of *Pramāṇa* and *Nīkṣepa*. We shall now proceed to the study of *Pramāṇa*.

*Pramāṇa* is the essential means of valid knowledge (*pramā*) "*Pramīyate yeno ta pramaṇam*". Naya system holds that *Sannikarṣa* (contact) and *jñāna* are the means of *Pramā*." For *Vaiśeṣika Sannikarṣa Svarūpalocana* and *jñāna* are means of *Pramā*." According to *Sāṃkhya* the activities of sense organs are *Pramāṇa*." *Prabhakara* regards *anubhūti* (experience) as *Pramāṇa*." The Jaina contention is knowledge is the only means of *Pramā* as right knowledge (*Pramā*) is of the nature of consciousness and non-conscious instruments cannot be the means of *Pramā*. Sense organs cannot be *Pramāṇa* since they are mediate means. Therefore, the Jainas have described *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* as indirect. The soul gets knowledge directly without the instruments of sense organs. That is *pratyakṣa jñāna*. The rest is *parokṣa*. *Avadhi*, *Manahparyāya* and *Kevala* were considered to be *Pratyakṣa jñāna*." But later in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in-tune with the theories of other systems of Indian philosophy they modified their conception of *pratyakṣa*. *Mati* and *Śruta* began to be called *samvyavahārika Pratyakṣa*." And perversity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge; and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes *ajñāna*." But when all the impediments, in the karmic veil, are removed omniscience (*kevala jñāna*) is possible. Omniscience is the single intuition of the whole world because it does not depend upon the sense

77. *Nyāya bhāṣya* - I 1, 3.

78. *Prāśastapada bhāṣya* pp 553

79. *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya* - I 87

80. *Sabara bhāṣya* - I. 1, 5

81. *Śihānāṅga sūtra* - II. 1, 7.

82. a) *Tattvārtha sūtra* - I, 9-12,

b) *Annoyagadvāra sūtra* - 1. 194.

c) *Nandī sūtra* - 4.

83. *Pancāstikāya sūtra* : 47.

organs and the mind. The pure intuition of the omniscient self knows all the objects simultaneously by a single stroke of intuition since it transcends the limits of time and space. It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical investigation which psychology and empirical sciences follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. "Progressive realisation of greater and subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists, especially with the introduction of psychical Research for analysing extra sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realisation would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single all embracing intuition."<sup>84</sup>

We have seen that *mati* and *Śruta* are considered to be indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa Jñāna*). It is believed that *Smṛti* (memory) *Pratyabhijñā* (Recognition), *cintā tarka* (inductive reasoning) *abhinibodha* (inference : *anumāna*) and *Śruta* (*Āgama*, testimony) are to be held as *Parokṣa*.<sup>85</sup> The difficulty whether *mati jñāna* is to be called direct (*pratyakṣa*) or indirect (*Parokṣa*) was solved by classifying it into *Samvyaavahāra Pratyakṣa*. Akalanka regards *anumāna* as *manomati*<sup>86</sup> and as *śruta*<sup>87</sup>. *Anumāna*, when it is for oneself is called *anakṣara śruta* and when it is communicated to others in the form of syllogism it is called *akṣaraśruta*, as in the case of *Svārtha* and *parārtha anumāna*. Akalanka regards *smṛti* (memory), *Pratyabhijñā* (Recognition), *Cintā* (discursive thought) and *abhinibodha* as mental perception (*manomati*) when they are not associated with words. But all these when they are expressed in language, are to be included in *Śruta*<sup>88</sup>. Akalanka makes a clear distinction between *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa Jñāna* stating that

84. Kaighatgi (T. G.) *Jaina View of life*.

(Jivaraj Granthamala, Sholapur-20, 1969) pp. 90

85. *Laghiyastaya* (Akalanka Granthalaya Sanghi Series, Bombay). 67.

86. Ibid.

87. *Tattvārtha Vārtikā* (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pīṭha, Banaras) I-20.

88. a) *Laghiyastaya* V. 10

b) *Siddhivinīścaya Vṛtti*. 1, 27.

*parokṣa* is non-distinct knowledge. Distinct knowledge is independent of other knowledge. Sense perception and mental perception are distinct because they do not depend on other knowledge, while *smṛti* and others are dependent on other knowledge. They are indistinct. They are *parokṣa*.

*Smṛti* involves the knowledge of the past. It is based on recollection of the past experiences, resulting in the precipitation of *saunikaṛṣa*. It is, however, valid knowledge because of its non-discrepancy (*avisamvādat*)<sup>89</sup>.

*Pratyabhijñā* (recognition) is the synthetic result of perception and recollection<sup>90</sup> based on the judgement of similarity (*tadsādṛśam*) and also sometimes judgements of dis-similarity (*tadvatakaṇam*). Similarly judgement of identity (*tadvedam*) may also work. Validity of recognition has been a difficult problem in Indian Philosophy. The Naiyayikas and Buddhists do not consider *pratyabhijñā* as *pramāṇa*, an independent source of knowledge, as recognition is nothing but a species of perception. The sāmkhya theory brought *pratyabhijñā* under perception. *Mīmāṃsakas* and Advaita vedantins hold that recognition is a kind of perception. But the jainas refute these arguments on the grounds that 1) Sense organs cannot go beyond the sphere of the present datum and 2) the criterion of non-discrepancy (*avisamvāda*) is very much present in *pratyabhijñā*. I have thoroughly discussed this problem in my book *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*.<sup>91</sup> Hence I have made a brief reference to the problem in this paper.

We now come to *anumāna* (inference) as a valid source of knowledge. Early Greek Philosophers gave theories about reasoning, as about other mental states, from logical systematisation based on introspection rather than from empirical

89. *Siddhiviniścaya* - III-2.

90. a) *Laghitvastraya* - vṛtti : V 10.

b) *Siddhiviniścaya*vṛtti-III; 4-5 (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pīṭha, 1956).

91. Kalghatgi (T. G.) *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology* (Karnatak University, Dharwad) 1961) pp. 105-111.

evidence in the modern sense"<sup>92</sup> Similar attitude was taken in early Indian Thought. Most of the Indian Schools of thought, with the exception of *cārvāka*, have given prominence to *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa*. Jainas hold that *anumāna* is the process of knowing an unperceived through the perception of a sign (*linga*) and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with the object. Hemachandra says that inference is the knowledge of the major term on the strength of the knowledge of the middle term.<sup>93</sup> The knowledge of the major term (*sādhya*) is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact and which arises from the middle term (*hetu*). It is the middle term by which the major term is inferred to be true of the minor term (*pakṣa*) *Pakṣa* is the object in which we infer the existence of something. *Sādhya* is the object which we want to establish in the *Pakṣa*. *Hetu* is the reason for establishing a relation between the *pakṣa* and the *sādhya*. For instance, *anumāna* leads to the knowledge of the hill having fire on the basis of the perception of the smoke on the hill.<sup>94</sup>

A distinction has been made in Indian thought between *svārthā-anumāna* (inference for one-self) and *parārthanumāna* (inference for others) In the *pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* similar distinction has been made<sup>95</sup>. *parārthanumāna* is expressed in the form of syllogism. There are five members (*avayava*) in the Nyāya Syllogism.

1. *Pratijñā* : Statement of what is to be proved.  
Fire on the hill.
2. *Hetu*-reason : There is smoke.
3. *Udaharaṇa* – Example : Where-ever there is smoke,  
there is fire E g. Kitchen.

92. Vinacke (L. E.) · *The Psychology of Thinking* (McGraw Hill 1952) pp 57-59

93. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* I, 2, 7

94. Kalghatgi (T. G.): *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology* : pp. 111-124.

95. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* ~ I 2, 8 and its commentary.



4. *Upanaya* : application of example.—The hill has smoke.
5. *Nigamana* : Conclusion — The hill has fire.

Jainas largely accept the five membered syllogism. Hemachandra describes the 'nature of the five propositions of the syllogism'. According to some Jaina Logicians like Bhadrabāhu, a syllogism may consist of 10 propositions. However Bhadrabāhu says that number of propositions in a syllogism depends on the calibre of the person to whom it is addressed<sup>96</sup>.

Akalanka considers *Tarka* (Inductive reasoning) as an independent source of knowledge, because to know the concomitance there is no other valid means than *tarka*. If concomitance is not known there is no possibility of inference<sup>97</sup>. We are, here, reminded of the objections raised against syllogism by modern logicians that it does not give any new knowledge in the conclusion. Hence, it is no inference at all. In the Aristotelian example—

1. All men are mortal.      2. Socrates is a man.
3. ∴ Socrates is mortal; the conclusion is already included in the major premise.

With reference to *vāda* (debate) *jalpa* (disputation) and *vitāṇḍa* (arguing for winning), Akalanka accepts the contention of Dharmakīrti and says that unfair means should not be employed in arguments. Fair means should be used for right aims.<sup>98</sup> Most of the Jaina authors after Akalanka follow him with the exception of Yośovijaya, who advocated the use of unfair means in exceptional cases.<sup>100</sup>

96. *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*—II. 1–15

97. *Daśavaikālika - nirṇyūkti* – 50 as quoted in *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā* – I (Singhi Jain Series) pp. 185.

98. *Siddhivinīścaya* – III. 8, 9.

99. *Siddhivinīścaya-vṛtti* V. 2

100. *Vāda-dvāitīmārtika* VIII. 6.

Before discussing the *Āgama pramāṇa*, it is necessary to know the Jaina view regarding the nature of *śabda* (word). The Jainas maintain that *śabda* is material in nature.<sup>101</sup> Akalanka is in favour of this theory and he has established the material nature of *śabda*<sup>102</sup> on the analogy of shadow and sunshine. Akalanka has rejected the Nyāya theory of *śabda* as the quality of the sky. He has criticised the eternity of the word as presented by the Mīmāṃsakas.<sup>103</sup> He has also criticised the Sphota theory of *śabda* of Vaiyākaraṇas.<sup>104</sup> Akalanka has rejected the *Apauruṣatva* concept of the Vedic traditions regarding the validity of the *Āgamas*.<sup>105</sup> The validity of the *Āgamas* depends on the authority of the person of un-impeachable integrity and knowledge. He is the *Āpta*.<sup>106</sup> The scriptures are the collections of the preachings of the *tirthaṅkaras*. The scriptures of the Jainas take the place of *śruti*. The scope of *Āgama Pramāṇa* is extended in the Jaina view to testimony. Any one with unerring knowledge and unimpeachable integrity and character becomes the *Āpta* in a limited sphere, as for instance, we accept the authority of the statement of the scientists like Albert Einstein in the field of the theory of Relativity. Similarly the Ācāryas, like Kundakunda and Samantabhadra are *Āpta* in the sphere of philosophy. Their philosophic presentation is *Āptavacana*.

We may consider the epistemological distinctions in *Sapta-bhaṅgi* as 1) *Pramāṇasapta-bhaṅgi* and 2) *Naya sapta-bhaṅgi*. *Pramāṇasaptabhaṅgi* can be interpreted as the dialectic of the seven-fold predications with reference to the valid source of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*). It is comprehensive and it embraces

101. a) *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* XXVIII, 12, 13

b) *Tattvārtha sūtra* V. 24.

102. *Siddhivinīścaya-tikā* . IX. 266.

103. *Siddhivinīścaya* : VI. 266.

104. *Ibid*.

105. *Ibid* VII. 28, 29, 30.

106. *Aṣṭabail* and *Aṣṭasahasri* pp 236. as quoted in the *Siddhivinīścaya-jikā* : (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pīṭha, 1956) Introduction.

all aspects of the apprehension of the object. It is called *sakalādeśa* (complete presentation). But a predication from a particular point of view (*naya*) is a partial presentation, because it does not give a comprehensive picture of the reality in all its aspects. Therefore, it is *Vikalādeśi*. It is the apprehension of an object from the particular point of view. It is also called *naya saptabhaṅgi*. The seven-fold predication (*saptabhaṅgi*) is comprehensive and *sakalādeśi* with reference to the *Pramāṇa* because the *pramāṇa* is a valid source of knowledge which is presented not from a particular point of view but from all angles. And the predication is called *pramāṇavākya*. The partial presentation from particular point of *naya* is called *nayavākya*.

The comprehensive predication with reference to the *pramāṇa* has its basis on the various considerations of the aspects of the object, like (1) *ātmarūpa* (nature of the object), (2) *artha* (its existence), (3) *kāla* (time), (4) *sambandha* (relation of the attribute of existence with the object as inherence), (5) *upakāra* (the function of the object), (6) *guṇidēśa* (the relation between the object and attributes) and (7) *samsarga* (the relation between attributes and the other attributes not known through the sense), (8) *śabda*: The existence is predicated of the word ('is'). Similarly the other inherent attributes of the objects are predicated of the word "is". The object like the pot (*ghaṭa*) exists, is black, is hard etc., The word "is" is a copula which connects the object with its logical implications. This appears to be a later development

*Naya saptabhaṅgi* gives prominence to the modes of a thing. The predication forms in the case of *naya saptabhaṅgi* have also to be made with reference to (1) *kāla*, (2) *ātmarūpa*, (3) *artha* (4) *sambandha*, (5) *upakāra* (6) *guṇidēśa*, (7) *samsarga*, (8) *śabda*. Every object is a synthesis of attributes and their modes. The relation between the attributes and modes is one of synthesis of non-difference and difference. When we are studying the object from the different aspects of *Pramāṇa*, we look at the object in the comprehensive way. But when we study the same object from the point of view of differentiation,

the differentiation becomes primary and the synthesis is secondary. Later logicians have gone into minute discussions about the problem.

## 2. *Nikṣepa* :

Man uses language which has numerous words. It is necessary to determine the exact meaning of the word with reference to the context and in a particular universe of discourse. *Nikṣepa* plays an important part in the determination of the exact meaning of that word.<sup>107</sup>

The function of *Nikṣepa* is to understand the exact content of the words in terms of meaning and its usage. The essence of *Nikṣepa* is to study the implications of the meanings of the words in their definiteness and to find out that implication. The function of *Nikṣepa* is to define words with reference to their content of the meaning and the usage. The other sense in which the *Nikṣepa* is used is "Nyāsa". It refers to implication and clarification. In the *Anuyogadvāra* it is stated that the main function of *Nikṣepa* is to clear the meaning of the word and to give the exact meaning. This is the use of *Nikṣepa*. *Nikṣepa* removes ambiguities and uncertainties in the meaning of the word

*Nikṣepa* can be distinguished from *pramāṇa* and *naya* with reference to its linguistic function. *Pramāṇa* and *naya* are primarily logical and epistemological. The function of *pramāṇa* is to comprehend the full nature of the object in all its aspects. *Naya* apprehends the nature of the object from a particular point of view and not in all aspects, but partially. But *Nikṣepa* is more concerned with the linguistic analysis of the function and their meanings. *Śabda naya*, *Samabhirūḍha naya* and *Evambhūta naya* are primarily the points of view of looking at an object. They are not very much concerned with the linguistic function of the word. But in the *Nikṣepa* we consider the

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107. *Dhavalā* : *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama* : 1. 10

function of the word with reference to its meaning and implication. We have to consider two types of the meaning of the word: (1) primary meaning and (2) the secondary meaning. To make a distinction between primary meaning and the secondary meaning is the important function of *Nīkṣepa*.

The basis of *Nīkṣepa* can be analysed into four aspects: (1) *Pradhāna* (Primary), (2) *Apradhāna* (Secondary) (3) *Kalpita* (Imagined) and (4) *Akalpita* (Unimagined). *Bhava* is unimagined *dṛṣṭi*. It is therefore primary. The other four *Nīkṣepas* are more concerned with mental construction. Therefore they are not primary.

We may also consider the distinction in the *Nīkṣepa* which can be analysed into four parts. (1) *Nāmanīkṣepa* (2) *Sthāpana Nīkṣepa* (3) *Dravya Nīkṣepa* and (4) *Bhava Nīkṣepa*. *Nāmanīkṣepa* refers to the proper name. A proper name is non-connotative. It is an arbitrary symbol for recognising an object. For instance, we call a very poor man as *Laxmipati*. In Western Logic J. S. Mill has stated that proper name is but an un-meaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object.<sup>108</sup> It is like the chalk mark made on a house by the robber in *The Arabian Nights* just for recognising. Miss Stebbing in *A Modern Introduction of Logic* has pointed out the deficiencies in the contention of Mill. She says some names like demonstrative symbols have no connotation and ordinary proper names and descriptive phrases have connotation<sup>109</sup>.

*Sthāpana Nīkṣepa* refers to the meaning of the word, although meaning may not be identical. The meaning of a thing is instituted and installed on an object. For instance— an idol is installed and called *Mahāvira*. *Sthāpananīkṣepa* is

108. *Logic* BK. I, Chapter-II, 5.

109. *A Modern Introduction to Logic* pp. 32. (Matheuen-1930)

of two types : (1) *Tadākāra* and (2) *Atadākāra* of different forms. For example, to identify the picture of Devadatta as Devadatta is called *tadākāra Sthāpanānikṣepa*. But if the picture of the animal like the elephant is knitted on a canvas in a small size it is called *Aatdākāra Sthāpanānikṣepa*. *Dravya Nikṣepa* is not primarily mental as it is not concerned with the intention or the idea of the person using the word. It presents the exact meaning of the object with reference to the present tense. For example, we use the description of an object in the present context of the state, although it may refer to the past state. Similarly, the future state may also be expressed with reference to the present state. A pot (*ghaṭa*) which contained ghee in the past or if it is meant to contain ghee in future we call it a ghee pot. The scope of the *Dravyanikṣepa* is very vast and it may be expressed in different forms.

*Bhava Nikṣepa* refers to the grasping of the meaning of the nature of the object through the word. A learned man who is a teacher and who is useful as a teacher may be called a teacher. This is *Āgamabhava Nikṣepa*. A teacher who is actually engaged in teaching may be considered to be a teacher in activity from the point of view of *No-Āgamabhava Nikṣepa*. In these cases a word has no reference to the aspect of the function in partial form. It has three forms like *Loukika*, *Kupravacanika* and *Lokottara*. These distinctions have been worked out and elaborated by later Logicians

In the *Dravyanikṣepa* there is implication of the absence of the cognitive function. But in the *Bhava nikṣepa* there is partial absence of the cognitive function. For example, a teacher makes some gestures by hand and turns over the pages. These activities are behavioural functions and do not refer to the conceptual content of the activity. In the *bhavanikṣepa* there is the expression of the present state and the mode of the object.

Every thing is expressed through *nikṣepa*. *Nikṣepa* plays an important part in the analysis of the function of language

and the determination of the exact meaning of the words. The Āgamic seers were aware of the fact that knowledge would be meaningful if we use definite language. Language in an instrument of expressing thought and words convey meanings. If we have to present thoughts coherently we have to be careful in using the words in order to avoid ambiguity. In the Western thought, we find Socrates emphasising the fact that we must define terms. Modern philosophers have turned towards the analysis of words as vehicle of meaning.

The Āgamic literature has given importance to *nikṣepa* as a means to the understanding of the exact meaning of the word. *Pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa* are complementary to each other. *Pramāṇa* and *naya* are primarily epistemological, although logical implications have been discussed as overtones of epistemological problems. *Nikṣepa* is primarily linguistic in its approach

*Laghiyastraya*<sup>110</sup> describes that the function of *Nikṣepa* is to remove the inadequate meaning of a word and to present the exact meaning. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has mentioned that *nikṣepa* is to present the correct meaning of the word.<sup>111</sup>

We may now consider the four types of *nikṣepa* in the light of logical and epistemological analysis. *Nāma nikṣepa* is an unmeaning mark. It is non-connotative. But, if the name given to the individual acquires connotation suggested by the name, it would be *Bhāva nikṣepa*. For instance, Vidyāsāgar becomes a learned man and Laxmipati earns millions. The names acquire connotation. But the expression of the content of the meaning is not important, although the parents might have been filled with pious wish towards their child. In the *nāma nikṣepa*, some proper names may have their various modes of expression suggesting different meanings. For instance, Indra is also

110. *Laghiyastraya-vṛtti*: 7, 2

111. *Tarkabhāṣā*, 3rd Pariccheda.

called Devendra, Surendra, Purandhara and Śakra. But proper name given to an individual cannot be exchanged to one of these names. Indra is always called Indra and not Śakra or Purandhara.

With reference to time (Kāla) *nāma-nikṣepa* has two aspects (1) Permanent and (2) Temporary. The names of permanent things are permanent. e. g. *Sūrya*, *Candra* and *Siddhaśīla*. They are *śāsvata*. In the cases where there are possibilities of change or modifications, the names are temporary (*aśāsvata*). For instance, a girl after marriage may change her name from *Kamala* to *Vimalā*.

*Sthāpana nikṣepa* refers to the identification of the meaning of the word, although the meaning may not be identical. In this we take a word and identify the meaning of the word with one object. *Sthāpana nikṣepa* is of two types 1. *Tadākāra* (of the same form) and 2 *Atadākāra* (of different form). In these cases *sadbhāva sthāpanā* and *asadbhāva sthāpanā* may also be distinguished. If the meaning of an object is fixed on the object of the same form, it is called *tadākāra sthāpanā*. For example, to identify the picture of Devadatta as Devadatta is called *tadākāra sthāpanā*. But if the picture of an elephant or a horse is woven on a carpet, such an identification of picture as elephant or horse is called *atadākāra sthāpanā*, because the identification and the object are not identical in form. *Nāma* and *sthāpana nikṣepa* are not very much significant with reference to the meaning of the objects in the practical life.

#### **Dravya Nikṣepa :**

*Dravya nikṣepa* does not refer to the subjective element, as to the nature of the object. Its state in the past, present and the future does not depend on our idea. Therefore, it is called *dravya nikṣepa*, because it expresses the state of the past or the present. For example sometimes we use the description of the past state in the present context. Similarly of the future state, we may refer in the present state. A pot which



contained ghee in the past may be still called the ghee pot. Similarly if a pot is purchased for keeping ghee in future, the pot may still be called the ghee pot. A person who was a judge in the past, but who has now retired, may still be called a judge. A person who is to be a king in future may be addressed as a king.

The scope of *dravya nikṣepa* is very vast. It may cover the expressions relating to the past or the future as projected in the present tense. The future king is also called king. And when the king is dead, his body is referred to as the king.

*Dravya nikṣepa* is of two types : 1) *Āgama dravya nikṣepa* and 2) "*no-āgama dravya nikṣepa*". *No-āgama dravya nikṣepa* is of three types . 1) *jñā-śarīra*, 2) *bhavya śarīra* and 3) *tadvyatirikta*. The Ātman knows through a body and this is called *jñā-śarīra* or *jñāyaka śarīra*. Similarly, we see the dead body of a learned man. And then we say that he was a learned man. This is *jñā-śarīra no-āgama dravya nikṣepa*.

If the ātman is embodied and that ātman will be all-knowing in future, it is called *bhavya śarīra*. By observing the lustrous qualities of the body and other characteristics of a child, we may say the child would become a learned man. This is *bhavya-śarīra no-āgama dravya nikṣepa*.

In the first two expressions of *nikṣepa*, the emphasis is on the body which is only the medium. In the third the emphasis is not so much on the body, but it is on the bodily activities like movement of the hands etc. For example when an ascetic is preaching, he may make gestures with the hands.

*Āgama dravya nikṣepa* refers to the implication of the meanings and the cognition content of the meaning, rather than the exact expressed form of the knowledge. In the *no-āgama dravya nikṣepa* there is the absence of both types of knowledge, expressed or implied. It only refers to the medium of knowledge i. e., the body. *No-āgama tadvyatirikta dravya nikṣepa*

does not possess any content of knowledge. Therefore it is called *dravya-nikṣepa*. This is of three types. 1) *Laukika*. For instance according to the common parlance of language "Śrīphala" is auspicious. 2) *Kuprāvacanika* : for example according to this "Vinayaka" (God Ganesh) is called auspicious. 3) *Loṇottara* : From the ultimate point of view religion with *jñāna* (knowledge), *darśana* (faith) and *caritra* (conduct) is auspicious.

In this way bereft of the content of the meaning (*bhāva śūnyatā*) and also bereft of the present state of the object (*varṭamāṇa punyāya śūnyatā*) we recognise the other states as the present state and we impose the present state and consider to be always there. This is *dravya nikṣepa*.

### **Bhāva nikṣepa :**

*Bhāva nikṣepa* refers to the grasping of the meaning of the nature of the object through the word.

The learned man who is a teacher and who is useful as a teacher may be said to be a teacher. This is *Āgama bhāva nikṣepa*. In this sense, he is a real teacher. A teacher who is engaged in the activities of teaching may be considered to be a teacher in activity from the point of view of "No-āgama bhāva nikṣepa".

In these cases, the word "no" has reference to the aspect or the function in partial form. It has three forms : 1) *Laukika*, 2) *Kuprāvacanika* and 3) *Loṇottara*.

We have seen that there are similar distinctions in the *no-āgama tadvyatirikta dravya nikṣepa*, but there is a primary difference in the emphasis of the two forms of *nikṣepa*. The word "no" in the *dravya nikṣepa* implies the absence of the cognitive functions (*āgama*). But in the *bhāva nikṣepa* there is a partial absence of cognitive functions. The scope of *dravya tadvyatirikta* is primarily activity and not cognitive function. While the scope of *bhāva tadvyatirikta* is two fold, i. e., the

expression of activity and also the cognition implied in the activity. For example, teacher makes some gestures by the hand and turns over the pages. These activities do not refer to the cognition. In this sense, the word 'no' in the *bhāva nikṣepa* refers to the partial negation. The function of *bhāva nikṣepa* is primarily concerned with the expression of the present state and the mode of the object. In this expression of *nikṣepa* there is the absence of the distinction of activity of the body as a medium of cognition. This is the difference between the two types of *nikṣepa*.

Everything is expressed through *nikṣepa*. It is the linguistic expression. There are infinite number of expressions, but everything has to be expressed in the form of four expressions of *nikṣepa*. Only one *nikṣepa* will not give a full picture of the state of the object. Every object has its name. It is *nāma nikṣepa*. It has its state. It is *sthāpanā nikṣepa*. It is referred to with reference to its material, it is *dravya nikṣepa* and there is the expression of its nature and its attributes. It is *bhāva nikṣepa*.



### III

## SYĀDVĀDA

The theory of *anekanta* is the special contribution of the Jainas to the Indian Philosophical thought, specially to Indian Logic and epistemology. It is the foundational principle of Jaina thought. *Anekanta* is the basic attitude of mind which expresses that reality is complex which can be looked at from different points of view. Points of view are the *nayas*, and *naya* is the psychological expression of the basic principle of *anekanta*. *Syadvada* is the logical expression of *nayavada* in predicational forms. The various points of view from which reality can be looked gives the possibility of comprehensive view of reality. Such a view needs expression for the sake of clarity and communication. This has been possible by means of seven fold predication. It is called *Saptabhangi*, because of its seven-fold predication. It is the formulation of the doctrine of the possibility of apparent contradiction in a real whole. The real may as well contain contradictions without affecting the nature

of the real, because the contradictions arise only because we take partial view of reality. According to the Jainas, other Darśanas present only the gleams of the broken light, while the Jaina view visualises the whole truth in its different aspects. *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda* are varieties of *Anekantavāda*. *Syādvāda* is complementary to the *Nayavāda*. *Nayavāda* is analytic in character and *Syādvāda* is synthetic. It investigates the various shades of the truth given by a *Naya* and integrates them into a consistent comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta suggests that the relation between them expresses the many alternatives indicated by the *Syādvāda* for any and every *Naya*.<sup>113</sup> In the *Syādvāda* all the aspects of truth are woven together into the synthesis of the conditioned dialectic.

*Syādvāda* is formed of the two words : *Syāt* and *vāda*. *Syāt* was very often supposed to suggest doubt or uncertainty. But it is definitive in its expression from a particular point of view, in a particular context in the particular universe of discourse.<sup>114</sup> *Vāda* is the presentation or a theory and *Syādvāda* is foundational theory of Jaina Philosophy. *Syādvāda* protests against one sided and dogmatic presentation of truth in fragments. It affirms that there are different facets of reality and they have to be understood and explained from various points of view. For this reason Ācārya Samantabhadra says that the word *Syāt* expresses an aspect of truth. He says that *Syādvāda kevalajñāna* are foundational facts of knowledge. *Kevalajñāna* is the direct experience and *Syādvāda* is the indirect experience expressed in propositional forms<sup>115</sup>

Sometimes a controversy has been raised as to whether *Syādvāda* is synonymous with *Saptabhaṅgī* or of the entire nature of Jaina Philosophy Prabhācandra says that *Syādvāda*

113 Dasagupta (S) *History of Indian Philosophy* (1921) Cambridge University Press 1957, Vol I p 181

114 *Aṣṭasahasrī* p 296

115 *Āptamīmāṃsā* : 105

is to be identified with *saptabhāṅgī*.<sup>116</sup> However this is just a scholastic problem and is not relevant for logical analysis and is needless from the philosophical point of view.<sup>117</sup> *Syādvāda* is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications (*Bhagaṇ*) affirm (*vidhi*), negate (*niṣedha*) or both affirm and negate severally and jointly in seven different ways a certain attribute (*bhava*) of a thing (*vastu*) without incompatibility (*avirodhena*) in a certain context (*prāśnavāṇī*).<sup>118</sup> Reality is complex and its nature cannot be expressed in an unconditioned position. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous.<sup>119</sup> And the 'syat' would mean 'in a certain sense, or 'from a certain point of view'.<sup>120</sup> In this sense *Syādvāda* warns us against building a dogmatic structure of reality in a single concept or judgement. That would be logical dogmatism (*nirapekṣavāda*) as against the *sāpekṣavāda* expressed in *Syādvāda*.

It is difficult to decide which is the earlier of the two. *Nayavāda* seems to be earlier. Umasvati in his *Tatvārtha-sūtra* describes the kinds of *Nayas*, but makes no mention of the *Syādvāda* and sevenfold propositions. Yet it is possible that it existed long before him. Buddhist Suttas mention the doctrine in an erroneous way as the doctrine not of the Niggaṇṭhas but of some recluse and Brahmins. In the earlier literature of the Jaina canon there are only a few passages in which there is a reference to *Syādvāda*. They occur in the *Bhagavati-sūtra*, in which it is expressed in the form of three propositions. Among the other early references, Bhadrabāhu's *Sātrakṛtāṅga Niryukti* is prominent. The developed form of the doctrine in the form

116 *Nyāyakumudacandra* (Bombay 1935) No. 655 *Syāddastivādī Saptabhāṅga-mayo vadati*.

117 Padmarajiah (Y. J.) *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge* : 305.

118 *Syādvāda manjari* (Edt by Dhruva 1933), pp. 142-143.

119 Hiriyanna(M) *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Allen Unwin 1931) p.163.

120 Padmarajiah (Y. J.) : *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 338.

of the seven-fold propositions is well described in *Pancastikayasāra* of Kundakundācārya and *Aptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena Divākara, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandi are among the later writers who have given a systematic exposition of the doctrine.

It would not be out of place to consider some of the views regarding antiquity and validity of the *Saptabhaṅgī* form of *Syādvāda*. In the earlier portion of the Āgamās roots of *Saptabhaṅgī* have been mentioned.<sup>121</sup> Ācārya Kundakunda has mentioned some predications of *saptabhaṅgī* as Affirmation, Negation and Affirmation-negation.<sup>122</sup> Later logicians have developed it in all its aspects. Some scholars have taken this as later development by logicians like Akalaṅka, Vidyānandi etc. It has also been maintained that Jaina logical thought had a comparatively late origin, and so the non-Jaina thinkers had already asserted their position even before the Jaina thinkers came to the arena. The Jainas had a lot to learn and assimilate. This view refers specially to the distinction of the types of knowledge, although logical concepts were also considered to be of later origin by these scholars.<sup>123</sup>

But this view need not be over-emphasised as an accepted dogma. We should recognise that the Jaina darśana was first presented by the tīrthaṅkaras. Gaṇadharas formulated and taught the same to the disciples. It was later expressed in the form of elaborated theories.<sup>124</sup> This gradual presentation of the Jaina thought does not mean that the tīrthaṅkaras and the Gaṇadharas were not aware of the full implication and the methodology of expression of the doctrine of *syādvāda*. The

121 Jivānam bhante, kim sāsāyā, asāsaya ?  
Goyamā, Jivā siya sāsāyā, siya asāsāyā,  
davaṭṭhāye sāsāyā, bhāvaṭṭhāyāye asāsāyā  
I Bhāgavati · 7, 2, 773

122 *Pancāstikāyasāra · Pravācanasāra* Siya atthi ṇatthi uhayam I.

123 Tatia (Nathmal) : Studies in Jaina Philosophy, (Banaras, 1951) pp 29

124 Bhadrabāhu : Attham Bhāsai arahā, suutam gunthati niupam I.



tīrthānkara has been considered to be a "sarvadarśi" and it is not possible to say that he did not know the implications and the methodological formulations of the doctrine of *syādvāda*. It would be apter to say that the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgi* was only elucidated by the Gaṇadharas and the later philosophers elaborated the theory. It is possible that the tīrthānkaras presented their teachings in a way suitable to the intellectual climate of the audience and the later philosophers developed it.

We get abundant evidence for the antiquity of *syādvāda* as presented in the Āgamas, in the dialogues between Mahāvira and the disciples, Gautama Gaṇadhara asked several questions regarding the nature and the state of *Jiva* in various conditions. Similarly, questions were asked regarding the predications of the nature of molecules in different forms. Mahāvira answered, and said that :

1. A molecule with two space units is Ātman from the point of self-nature of the Ātman.
2. From the point of view of the other nature of the Ātman, it is not atman.
3. From the point of view of both the self and the other natures, it is indescribable.
4. From the point of view of the mode of existence of a molecule of one place unit (*ekadeśi*) and of the mode of non-existence of the sama, a molecule of two space points has a predication of affirmation and negation.
5. From the point of view of the mode of existence of one place unit (*ekadeśi*) and of non-existence of the other place unit, a molecule of two space points has the predications of affirmation and inexpressibility.
6. A molecule of one place unit, having the mode of non-existence, and of the other place unit having the

modes of existance and non-existance, a molecule of two space points has the predications of Negation and inexpressibility.<sup>125</sup>

In the same way, Mahāvira explained the various predication formulations with reference to a molecule with three place units, a molecule of four place units and so also of five and six place units. Molecule of five place units presents twenty-two propositional predications, and there are twenty three propositional forms in the case of molecule of sixplace units.<sup>126</sup>

From the discussion given above it is clear that the seven-fold predication scheme called *saptabhāṅgī* is not a later development presented by the Ācāryas. It is to be found in the Āgamic literature in all its implications. This methodological scheme was presented in the form of explanations to the questions asked by the Gaṇadharas. It was not presented as a theory of logic or epistemology. It was only later philosophers who elaborated the implications already present in the Āgamic literature. Pandit Dilsukh Malvania in his *Āgama yug kā Jaina darśana* has given emphasis on this point of view.

In the seven predication forms, affirmation, negation and inexpressibility are primary, others are derivative. In the *Bhagavati sūtra* seven-fold predications are mentioned. In the *Pancastikāyasāra* Kundakundācārya has mentioned the seven-fold predications. The predication of *avaktavya* (inexpressibility) has been made the third predication in the *Bhagavati sūtra* and in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*. In the *Pancastikāyasāra* the predication of *avaktavya* has been mentioned as the fourth predication. But in the *Pravacanasāra* it has the third place. Later philosophers have used both methods.

125 *Bhagavati śataka*-12, 3010.

126 *Bhagavati*, 10, 10, 469.

*Syādvāda* is based on three fundamental predications 1. *asti* (affirmation) 2. *nāsti* (negation) and 3. *avaktavyam* (undescribability). These three predications have been developed into seven predications with their possible permutations. *Syādvāda* has been generally expressed in the seven-fold predication : 1) *asti* (affirmation), 2) *nāsti* (negation), 3) *asti-nāsti* (affirmation and negation), 4) *avaktavyam* (indescribable), 5) *asti-avaktavyam* (affirmation and indescribability), 6) *nāsti-avaktavyam* (negation and indescribability) and 7) *asti-nāsti-avaktavyam* (affirmation negation and indescribability) These seven-fold predications constitute the elements of *syādvāda* and they can be considered as *saptabhaṅgī*. We have already seen that every predication is preceded by the word *Syāt*. *Syāt* has been very often interpreted as "Perhaps". But we have asserted that there is not in the least the element of doubt in the predications. There is no uncertainty. The predications are definitive in their expression. It would be apter to interpret the word *Syāt* as 'in a particular context' from 'a particular point of view' *naya* and in a particular universe of discourse. *Syādvāda* shows there are seven ways of describing a thing, its attributes and modes. It attempts to reconcile the apparent contradictions in the predications regarding the nature of a thing. The seven-fold predications are to be studied in the contextual references of four principles : 1) *dravya* (substance,) 2) *kṣetra* (place), 3) *kāla* (time) and 4) *bhāva* (nature). That gives a comprehensive view of the nature of the object. For instance, a bar of gold has its value as *dravya*. If it is converted into ornaments, it would have value for ladies. If it is converted into a crown the King values it. If it is simply in a locker, ladies might ask-what is the use ? For a *muni* gold is as valueless as any other object of possession (*Parigraha*)

1) *Syād asti* asserts the existence of a thing in a particular context, from a particular point of view. From a particular point of view of its substance (*svadravya*), its place of (*svakṣetra*), its time (*svakāla*) and its nature (*svabhāva*) the jar exists as it is made of clay in a particular place and time.

A house exists, it is a house—from the point of view of structure as it has well built kitchen, bath room etc. But, if it is rented for a godown, it is not a house at all from the functional point.

2) *Syad nāsti* : But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation of its opposite and such a negation is a logical necessity. Then we get the predication of *nāsti*. It means that in the other context a thing does not exist. The house is no longer used as a house if it is to be used as a godown. The existence of the house is denied in different context. We may state the instance of the story of Eudipus in Greek Mythology. Eudipus killed his father and married his mother. He came to know of it later and he subjected himself to unbearable physical and mental torture. Now the question arises – what is his relation to his mother? From one point of view she is his mother, from another in the present context, she is his wife and from a third with reference to some other relation referring to the past, she may be his cousin. Thus the complexity of relation cannot be categorically explained from only a particular point and in a specific situation and a full comprehensive picture of a thing would not be possible if we restrict our study from one aspect or the other. We have a similar story of Devadatta, like that of Eudipus, in the Jaina mythology. But the difference is their outlook. Eudipus subjected himself to physical and mental torture. But Devadatta got disgusted towards this worldly life and turned towards the path way to spiritual perfection. He renounced the house-holder's life and became a *muni*. This aspect is not relevant for our discussion.

The importance of this predication lies in the irrefutable statement of the non-existence of a thing in the other context. 'No-existence or non-being is a determinate fact with a content and not a void'.

It would not be correct to say that first and the second predications involve contradiction, because i) they are mutually

complementary and if) the two predications are not absolute assertions. The definition itself includes the clause 'avirodhena'.<sup>127</sup>

It is very often contended that the contradictions, absolute existence and non-existence, are not objective facts, as no existence is known to have absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication of the unreal opposition is not necessary. But, as Prof. Mukerjee points out, it cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not ontologically real. The predications are therefore logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non-existence.<sup>128</sup> The Vedāntist believes in the absolute existence of the one reality. The Śūnyavādin does not believe in the existence of the absolute. The Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they serve to exclude absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The mention of the word *syāt* functions as a necessary condition and works as a corrective against the absolute way of thought. We may, here, refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for they are the aspects of the same reality. However, the reference would be limited to the dialectical process, because the Jaina is a realist and believes in the validity of empirical experience.

The third predication is *syād asti nāsti* : 'It is, it is not'. This refers to different contexts simultaneously. For instance, in a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not exist. The building is a house in so far as the purpose of the construction was for residence. But it is not a house as it is actually used as a godown. It is very often

127. Padamarajiah (Y, J.) *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, pp. 338.

128. Satkari Mukerjee : *Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism* Ch. VI.

maintained that the predication is a mere summation of the first two. But the Jainas would appeal to experience and say that it gives a separate entity arising from the two but not the summation of the two. For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, because the flowers enter into a new relation with each other to form a whole. Similarly, in the description of the soul and the ultimate reality contradictory predicates have been made.

The fourth is a new predication. It expresses the indescribability of a thing. It is *syād avaktavyam*. It is possible that the real nature of the thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of words. For instance, in the case of the jar, it exists in the *svadravya*, *svarūpa*, *svakāla* and *svakṣetra* and no existence is predicated in the *paradravya*, *para-rūpa*, *para-kṣetra* and *para-kāla*. Yet its nature may be such that it cannot be easily described.

It is contended that the fourth predication is only an abbreviated form of affirmation and negation. The third predication shows the successive presentation, while the fourth gives the simultaneous presentation of the two. But as Prof Mukerjee points out, it is still logically necessary, because it presents the facts of experience, that existence and non-existence are equally possible to be predicated in the same degree. Moreover, experience shows that the inexpressible asserts that the attributes are existing together, and a new element has arisen due to the synthesis. For instance, intoxicating liquor may be formed due to the combination of jaggery and ghātakī flowers. But it is not a mere combination of the elements. It has in itself an identity of its own which cannot be described easily. In metaphysical speculation, the 'unknowable' of Herbert Spencer may be likened to predication of this type. Prof Bhattacharya writes,<sup>129</sup> 'The given indefinite'—

129 K. C. Bhattacharya *Jaina Theory of Anekānta* pp. 13.

'the unspeakable' or *avaktavya* as it has been called, as distinct from the definite existence, presents something other than consecutive togetherness : it implies *saharpana* or co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation. The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept.<sup>130</sup>

The primary modes of predication are three : *syad asti*, *syad nāsti* and *syad avaktavyam*. The other four are obtained by combining the three.

The third predicate *asti nāsti* offers successive presentation. In the fourth predication 'inexpressible' (*avaktavyam*) we get the expression of simultaneous predication. Dr. Padmarajah discusses the four stages through which the concept or 'inexpressible' has developed : 1) The naive negative attitude in the *Ṛgveda* as expressed in the song of creation (Book V, 129), 2) A positive attitude as expressed in '*sadasadvareṇyam*' in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. It conceives with being and non-being as inherent in reality, owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed as the *ubhaya* phase of the concept, 3) The third phase is the logically sophisticated phase of the 'negative tendency' as shown in the expression like as *ēṣa neti neti* (*Br. Up.* IV 5-15). In this phase here is the clear awareness of the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality would be beset with contradictions. The Vedānta conception of *anirvacanīya*, the Buddha's *avyākṛta* and Nāgārjuna's conception of the ultimate as being *catuṣkotivīnirmukta* come under this stage, 4) The last phase in 'the dialectical evolution' of the idea of the inexpressible is expressed in the *avaktavya* of the *Syādvāda*. It is a relativistic (*sāpekṣa*) view and not the absolute view as presented in *anirvacanīya*. The Jaina states that *sat* and *asat*, in these combinations, are inevitable and

130 Satkari Mukerjee . *Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism* pp. 166

distinctive feature of our objective experience.<sup>131</sup> Again the *avaktavya* may show the inability to embody, within one symbol, the two fundamental aspects of reality with equal prominence. But this limitation is itself a necessary step in the dialectical movement of *Syādvāda*.

K. C. Bhattacharya states '...If the inexpressible is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence. It is a category by itself.'<sup>132</sup>

The fifth predication is formulated as *syād asti avaktavyam*. From the point of view of its own contexts (*dravya*, *rūpa*, *kāla* and *kṣetra*) thing is and is indescribable. It asserts the co-presence of the two attributes, existence and inexpressibility. Both are real and necessary attributes. Existence relates to an object in the context of substance in respect of its internal determinations. Inexpressibility is an attribute which relates substance, in relation of identity and distinction, to its changing modes

The sixth proposition expresses the negative aspect together with inexpressibility. It is *syād nāsti avaktavyam*. In the context, it is not and is indescribable. In relation to the *para-dravya*, *para-rūpa*, *para-kṣetra* and *para-kāla* it is not; it is indescribable.

The seventh proposition asserts existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. It reads : *syād asti nāsti avaktavyam*. In the contexts, it is, is not and is inexpressible. With reference to the *sva-rūpa*, *sva-dravya*, *sva-kṣetra* and *sva-kāla* it exists, and with reference to the *para-dravya*, *para-rūpa*, *para-kṣetra*, *para-kāla* non-existence can be predicated. Yet in, its real

131 Padmarajah (Y J) : *The Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge* : pp 348-355

132. K. C Bhattacharya *The Jaina Theory of Anekānta* : pp. 14



nature it may be such that it cannot be easily described. As Prof. Mukerjee says, this predication gives a fuller and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is not.

Affirmation and negation and inexpressibility are the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a positive basis. Even imaginary concepts like the sky-flower possess a positive basis in the two reals, the sky and flower, although the combination is unreal. All things which are objects of thought *are* in one sense, and are *not* in another sense.

The doctrine of *Syādvāda* has been subjected to severe criticism by eminent philosophers from Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmaṇujācārya to the modern philosophers. We may mention a few of them here :

1) It is said that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certainty, the assertion of contradictory predicates implies that the present predicating is in doubt. Belvalkar says that *Syādvāda* is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude. With this agnostic and negative attitude one can not have any dogma, and Śaṅkarācārya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when he says—"As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthaṅkara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate?"<sup>133</sup> Prof. Hiriyanna makes *Syādvāda* a variety of scepticism. If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say (the old Indian critics like Śaṅkara,

133. *The undercurrents of Jainism* (An article in the Indian Philosophical Review Vol. I No. 1 1947 edited by A. C. Widdgeny and R. D. Ranade, Bombay). pp. 33.

Rāmaṇuja etc.) the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality, and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.<sup>134</sup>

But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are not present in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree in the dusk and doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to the lack of determination between the specific features of the object as the perception is faulty. But in the case of the seven-fold presentation the attributes of existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible.

It is said that the sevenfold predication, of the Jainas is beset with contradictions. Affirmation and denial of the attribute in the same object is not logically possible. It would be a self-contradiction. In this context we may refer to the criticism of Saṃkara and Rāmaṇuja. Saṃkara's criticism can be analysed into three stages. 1) he tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of the predication because of the inherent contradictions involved in it. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together. But if we take into consideration the different contexts referred to, we may say that the contradictions can be easily reconciled. In experience we get examples of co-existing conflicting attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The same individual may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. 2) He points out the futility of the doctrine because the doctrine is indefinite. The unlimited assertion that all things are of non-exclusive nature gives indefinite assertion like *syād asti* and *syād nāsti*. Hence a man who holds such a doctrine of indefinite context does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man.

134. Hiriyanna : *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (Allen Unwin) 1949 pp. 69

Recent writers on Indian philosophy have reiterated the entire charge made by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and have shown that it is a kind of eclecticism, 'a putting together of several partial truths' without a proper synthesis. It is therefore characterised as a sort of compromise philosophy. The half-hearted attempt of Jaina enquiry as expressed in *Saptabhāṅgī* stops at giving partial truth together and does not attempt to overcome the opposition implied in them by a proper synthesis.

But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and absolute assertion, then the 'indefiniteness' of the doctrine is a logical necessity. As Radhakrishnan points out<sup>135</sup> the criticism of the *Saptabhāṅgī* doctrine as of no practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as such need not be considered.

3) Śaṅkara also says that the *Saptabhāṅgī* doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of Jaina philosophy. The assertions of existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist and not exist and may be indescribable.<sup>136</sup>

The dialectic of *Syādvāda* is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. It could not have sprung from the same teacher and the same philosophical background. "As a mere '*anaikāntika*' (sic) theory of predication, the *Syādvāda* must return upon itself and end in doubting the doubter himself."<sup>137</sup> Prof. Radhakrishnan after mentioning the strong points of *Syādvāda*, says "Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their

135. Radhakrishnan (S) *Indian Philosophy* Vol. I (Allen Unwin) 1931 pp 304.

136. a) Śaṅkara *bhāṣya* on *Vedānta Sūtra* II, 33.

b) Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya* on *Vedānta Sūtra*, II, 2, 31.

137. *Brahmasūtra* of Bīdarīyana, Belvalkar's Edition 1931 : Notes.

own logic"<sup>138</sup>. But in the *Saptabhaṅgī taraṅgiṇī* we read a counter argument. If the final release and heavenly bliss are eternal and existing, where is the chance for *saṃsāra* and the attempt to obtain *mokṣa*? If the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is impossible to attain? Radhakrishnan points out that the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine is not inconsistent with the other views of the Jains. It is a logical corollary of the *Anekāntavāda*. All that the Jains say is that everything is of a complex nature and real reconciles the difference in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in the world of experience.

Rāmānuja also pointed out that contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing any more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the distinction between *dravya* and *pariyāya*, substance and modes. He also sees that the substance has permanence; *pariyāya* implies change.

But the predications give severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths from efferent points of view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither scepticism nor agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid. It is supplemented and harmonised by the other predication into a single comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different notes.

With all their criticisms, Belvalkar makes *Syādvāda* the most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan observes "Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja criticise the *Saptabhaṅgī* view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory sributes co-existing in the same thing". After quoting the relevant passage from Rāmānuja he proceeds to say: "The Jains admit that a thing

138 Radhakrishnan (S) *Indian Philosophy* Vol. I (Allen Uniwın) 1931 pp. 305.

cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature, and reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground.<sup>139</sup>

In the Western thought, Zeno among the Greeks, formulated the Dialectical method of approach to the problem of reality. He established the theory of Being by proving that Becoming is not. That was the beginning of dialectical movement in Western Philosophy. Socrates used the question and answer method in proving the inadequacy of the views held by the disputant. The Socratic method is direct dialectic involving conversation between the two.

In modern philosophy the Hegelian dialectic comes nearer to the *Anekanta* and its expression in *Syadvada*. Hegelian dialectic in thought moves from thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Being, nothing and becoming is the first Hegelian triad. The second category of negation is not brought in by Hegel by any external source. It is deduced from the first category of affirmation and therefore, the first category of affirmation contains its negation and is identical with it. There is no contradiction because being involves non-being and it is both is and is not when it becomes. The third category contains the underlying harmony. The exclusion is not absolute. It is identity of opposites. The opposition is just as real as identity. If we forget this and try to maintain that identity implies the illusory nature of the opposition we fall into the gravest of the dialectical fallacy.<sup>140</sup> But Hegel did not work out the dialectic rigorously in all cases. Had he brought about the synthesis, the synthesis between understanding and reason, he would have brought the spirit of *anekanta* in his system.

139. Ibid. pp. 134.

140. Stace (WT) : *Philosophy of Hegel* : Dover Publications, INC, 1960) pp. 96.

He would have made his philosophy more synoptic and comprehensive and not merely rigorously rationalistic, formal and deductive <sup>141</sup>

In recent Western Philosophy A. N. Whitehead's theory of 'coherence' expresses the concept of *anekanta*. It presents his attitude to reality by the complete problem of the metaphysics of substance and of flux as a full expression of the union of the two notions. Substance expresses permanence and flux emphasises impermanence and change. Reality is to be found in the synthesis of the two. Both are real. Whitehead showed that reality can best be understood by the integral approach in which the ultimate postulates of permanence and change are harmoniously blended. "No entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence."<sup>142</sup> "All general truths condition each other; and the limits of their application cannot be adequately defined apart from their co-relation by yet wider generalities" <sup>143</sup>

And Bertrand Russell's "*doctrine of perspectives*" does bring us nearer to the *Anekanta* view of understanding reality. Like the Jaina view, Russell believes that the world is objective and that reality is manifold. The object presents many appearances at a moment. These appearances are *sense-data* revealing different aspects of the object. All these different aspects are real, but the object as a whole cannot be identified with any one of the aspects. It is logically constructed out of sense data. "All the aspects of a thing are real whereas the thing is a

141 *Bhagavân Mahāvîra and his Relevance to Modern Times* : Etd. Prem Suman Jain, Bikaner, 1976 Article by Kalghatgi (TG) *Jaina Dialectic and Modern Thought* p. 50

142 Whitehead (AN) *Process and Reality* : (1929) Part-I, Ch. 1, Section 1

143 *Ibid* Section IV

merely logical construction.<sup>144</sup> A thing, therefore, is complex and Russell does not identify an aspect of a thing with the whole thing. The thing is perceived by an individual in one aspect or the other. This is the private view ? <sup>145</sup>. This does not lead to subjectivism, because the thing is real and it does not consist of the totality of the perceptive views, but also of the logically possible views. It is possible to know the thing in entirety if all its perspectives, perceived and unperceived are known. But this is not possible. Therefore, we cannot comprehend the nature of a thing in entirety at any one moment. Thus the Jaina conception of relativity of knowledge, and not as subjective alone, finds its expression in many modern Western Philosophers.

*Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgī* presents a methodology of predications which is meant for giving a comprehensive picture of reality. Modern science has realised that the methodology adopted by *Syādvāda* is very useful for statistical investigations of probability. quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Professor Mahalanobis and J. B. S. Haldane have discussed the importance of *Syādvāda* in the theory of probability. Professor Kothari has presented the analysis of the application of the methodology of *Syādvāda* in Quantum Mechanics. J. B. S. Haldane and Mahalanobis have emphasised the value of the Jaina theory of *Syādvāda* for the methodological investigations of science<sup>146</sup>.

Recent researches in the theory of probability and statistics have shown the enormous importance of the Jaina theory *syādvāda* in understanding the problems of probability. In the journal *Samkhyā* Vol 18 Parts 1 and 2, Dr. Mahalanobis has

144 Russell (Bertrand) . *Our Knowledge of the External World* (Allen Unwin Revised Edt. 1926) pp 96

145. Ibid.

146. *Bhagavān Mahāvira and his relevance to Modern times* : (Edt. Prem Suman Jain, Bikaner, 1976) : Article see Article by Kalghatgi T. G. entitled : *Jaina Dialectic and Modern Thought*

discussed the impact of *Syadvada* doctrine in the interpretation of the theory of probability in statistics. In his paper entitled *The Foundations of Statistics* in the journal mentioned above Dr. Mahalanobis has made certain observations on the implications of *Syadvada* to the problems of probability. He says that there are certain ideas in Indian-Jaina logic called *Syadvada* which seem to have close relevance to the concepts of probability. He makes certain observations on the relevance of the doctrine of *Syadvada* in understanding the foundations of statistics<sup>147</sup>.

1) The fourth predication of *Syadvada avaktavyam* or the 'indeterminate' seems to be in essence the qualitative (but not quantitative) aspect of the modern concept of probability.

2) The Jaina concept of the real as a particular which possesses the generic attribute is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which he belongs.

3) Jaina philosophy emphasises the relatedness of things and the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar to the basic ideas underlying concepts of association and correlation.

4) The Jaina view of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristic of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and yet relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning.

5) The important feature of Jaina logic is its insistence on the impossibility of absolutely certain predication and its emphasis on non-absolutist and relativist predication. "All predications have margin of uncertainty which is somewhat similar to the concept of "uncertain inference" in modern statistical theory. However, the Jaina view is essentially qualitative

147. For Similar discussion refer to the Book Compendium of Jainism by Justice T K Tukol, (Karnataka University, Dharwad, 1980) pp. 314-319



in this matter. Jainas rely on the data supplied by experience and show the inadequacy of formal logic.

I do not know whether it would be correct to say that the sevenfold predication implies 'margin of uncertainty', because every point of view, *naya*, does present a clear picture of thing, though a partial picture.

J. B. S. Haldane, in the same issue of the journal *Samkhya* has applied the Jaina logical methodology of the seven-fold predication to the statistical analysis of the problems concerning the physiology of the sense organs.

J. B. S. Haldane has made, in this paper, an elaborate and critical analysis of the sevenfold predication of the Jainas with reference to the statistical study of the physiological problems of sense organs. He shows that he has come to conclusions similar to those of *Bhadrabahu*. And he says, 'No doubt we reached it by different methods, *Bhadrabahu* by meditation, I by thinking about the result of concrete experiments on animals'. It is unrealistic to pretend that ancient philosophers anticipated all modern intellectual developments. And I believe that we, today, can do more honour to their memories by thinking for ourselves, as they did, than by devoting our lives to commentaries on them. But if we do so, it is our duty to point out cases where it turns out that our own thought has run parallel to theirs.

Dr. D. S. Kothari has analysed the relevance of *Syadvada* to the study of the problems of modern physics in his illuminating paper *Modern Physics and Syadvada* published in the proceedings of the Indian National Science Academy, New Delhi, in 1975<sup>148</sup>. He was kind enough to send a cyclostyled copy of

148 I have quoted extensively from his paper, *Modern Physics and Syadvada* (cyclostyled copy kindly sent to me by Dr. D. S. Kothari) published in the Indian National Science Academy, New-Delhi in 1975.

the paper for my study. I am grateful to him for this. I have made an honest effort to understand the paper in the light of my study of Jaina Logic and Western thought, although my knowledge of modern physics is inadequate to cope up with this work.

Dr. Kothari has discussed the relevance of the doctrine of *Syādvāda* with reference to the principle of Complementarity enunciated by Dr. Niels Bohr. Dr. Kothari begins his paper with the significant statements of Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr. "The most incomprehensible thing about the Universe is that it is incomprehensible (Albert Einstein). The one certain thing is that a statement like "existence is meaningless" is itself devoid of meaning (Niels Bohr) "


Dr Kothari says, "*The principle of Complementarity* which we owe principally to Niels Bohr is perhaps the most significant and revolutionary concept of modern physics. Philosophically it should be noted, it is very close to the concept of *Syādvāda*. Bohr had great faith in the future role in human affairs of the practical philosophy of complementarity. It can enable people to see that seemingly irreconcilable points of view need not be contradictory. These, on deeper understanding, may be found to be complementary and mutually illuminating. The complementarity approach allows the possibility of accomodating widely divergent human experiences into an underlying harmony, and bringing to light new social and ethical vistas for exploration and for alleviation of human suffering. Bohr fervently hoped that one day complementarity would be an integral part of everyone's education and provide guidance in the problems and challenges of life. For Bohr the complementarity approach which accomplished one of the greatest revolutions in natural philosophy was also of the utmost relevance for every aspect of man's life.

Modern physics (relativity and quantum theory) provides, as never before, far-reaching examples of, and insight into, *Syādvāda*. Also *Syādvāda* makes it much easier to grasp the

the complementarity principle in physics. Above all *Syādvāda*—and so the complementarity approach—is a guide for the conduct of life and moral advancement of man. *Syādvāda* is indispensable for the pursuit of truth and *ahimsa* in all their varied aspects.

“A favourite maxim of Bohr of interest in connection with *Syādvāda* is the distinction between the two kinds of truths, profound truths and trivial truths. For a profound truth its opposite or negation is also a profound truth. For a trivial truth its opposite is false, an absurdity. Statements expressing the highest wisdom often involve words whose meaning cannot be defined un-ambiguously. Thus the truth of a statement of the highest wisdom is not absolute, but is only relative to a suitable meaning for the ambiguous words in it, with the consequence that the converse statement also has validity and is also wisdom.”

Dr. Kothari presents an example of the behaviour of an atom, limiting himself to the domain of logical empirical experience. In the common sense language, when we make two statements about the existence of a table or a chair and say, ‘the chair is in the room’ and ‘the chair is not in the room’, both cannot be true at the same time and both cannot be false at the same time. The Laws of Contradiction and of the Excluded Middle, seem to be operative in these cases. “But this fundamental principle of logic and common sense is in general violated in atomic phenomena. Atoms in general behave in a manner completely foreign, totally repugnant, to the common sense and classical logic.



Consider an idealized situation which brings out the essentials. There is an 'atom' in a closed 'box'. The box is divided by a partition into two equal compartments. The partition has a very small hole so that the atom can pass through it. The hole can be closed if desired. According to classical logic the atom can be either in the left compartment (L) or in the right compartment (R). There is no third alternative. But the new physics forces us to admit other possibilities to explain adequately the results of experiments. If at all we use the word 'box' and 'atom', then there is no escape whatsoever from admitting—in some strange way which totally defies description in words — *that the same atom is, at the same time, in both the compartments*. What we are speaking of is not a case of the atom being sometimes in the left compartment and sometimes in the right compartment; but being in *both* the compartments at the same time. It is an idea crazy beyond words. And so it is. But there is no escape.

In this way, Dr. Kothari analyses the situation in respect of the position of an atom in a closed box and shows that to talk in the language of atomic reality, and not from the plane of everyday reality, it is important to recognise that to talk of things in the plane of everyday reality in the language of the plane of atomic reality is to talk nonsense. "In terms of the plane of everyday reality it is inexpressible or *avaktavya*. It is this inexpressibility or *avaktavya*—property that provides a clue, a pointer to the existence of the plane of atomic reality

Dr. Kothari further analyses the seven modes of *syadvāda* and shows how the quantum mechanical representation can be presented in the *Syadvāda* models of description.

Professor N. Umakantha, Department of Physics, Karnatak University, Dharwad, has prepared a paper on the epistemological significance of *Syadvāda* with special reference to the theory of probability. In that paper he has made use of a new concept "Represental" in addition to the particular denoting an individual and the universal connoting the universal signifying

the particulars of the same class. Man is a universal. Mr. Smith is a particular. Our main point is that in statistical analysis (and in the theory of probability) we need a new kind of abstraction which we call "represental". With reference to vision, for instance, Man has different possible states of vision. A particular man, Mr. Jones, for instance, has only one of these states of vision at any time. In between these there is an intermediate level of cognition of which we are not interested in which particular man has which state of vision but only in the number of men having different states of vision. This is statistical analysis. Prof. Umakantha considers that with the concept of the 'represental' whose epistemological status is in between a particular and the universal *Syadvada* becomes the foundation of epistemology."<sup>149</sup>

We may add a note on the role of logic in the Western thought today. The foundations of Western Logic were laid by Aristotle. Aristotle's syllogism aimed at establishing the arguments on the basis of consistency and validity in the premises. His syllogism was deductive and formal with least reference to material truth of the premises. For example – the argument. All men are mortal, Socrates is a man; ∴ Socrates is mortal – is formally valid and materially true, since the premises are true to fact. But in the argument – All men are mortal, This table is a man. ∴ This table is mortal. The minor premise is false. Still the argument is formally valid. All philosophy and logic, for several centuries were profoundly influenced by Aristotle's thought. In fact, as some philosopher has put it, all subsequent philosophy in the West was nothing but foot-notes to Aristotle's thought. It was Francis Bacon who brought about a Copernican revolution in logic and methodology of thought and freed logic from the shackles of Aristotle's formalism. He presented the beginnings of the methodology of science. It was Leibnitz who gave a new look

149. I have referred to Dr. Umakant's manuscript paper. I have referred to his points discussed in the paper with his permission.

to Formal logic. He gave the Calculus of Logic. Yet, Leibnitz was not fully free from Aristotle's influence. He arrived at the structure of 24 Aristotelian syllogisms, 6 in each of 4 figures. He was predominantly vexed by symantic considerations, namely, whether to think of the matter in extension or intention – whether in 'all a is b' it is the a's which are said to be contained in the b's or the property *a* which contains the property *b*.

To Carnap we owe the extension of the technique of modern logic to epistemology, physics and to a variety of other disciplines. Carnap believed that all meaningful sentences belong to the language of science or, if philosophical, are simply part of the syntax of that language. The wide interest of Carnap's investigation is in part due to his adoption of the "Principle of tolerance" according to which he was prepared to countenance any form of expression, despite the philosophical problems surrounding the interpretation, provided that sufficient logical rules governing their use were given. He has extended his meta-theoretic investigations of semantic notions such as truth and meaning which previously he did not consider amenable to formal analysis, and once more his analyses have provided a starting point for the subsequent enquiry.<sup>150</sup>

Many values logic and proof theory :- Non-Euclidian geometry are often mentioned in the discussions of the status of many valued logic, but they appear to have had no direct influence. It is likely that the theory of groups (closed system operation) which was already finding widespread application by the end of the 19th century – and the rise of different Algebras – did much to create the climate of thought in which the proof theory and in general the meta-logical aspect of the properties of entire deductive system could be developed. Such investigation seems to be one of the most notable characteristics differentiating mathematical logic from the logic of any other field.<sup>151</sup>

150 *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Edr in Chief: Paul Edward, McMillan and Free Press, U S A. 1967) Vol. 4, Logic pp. 560.

151 *Ibid* pp. 553.

In his *Introduction to Logic* Copi maintains that truth and falsehood may be predicated of propositions, but never of arguments. And the properties of validity and invalidity can belong only to deductive arguments, never to propositions. There is a connection between the validity or invalidity of the argument and the truth or falsehood of its premises and conclusion. But the connection is by no means a simple one. Some valid arguments contain only the propositions. For example—All whales are mammals; All mammals have lungs. ∴ All whales have lungs. But an argument may contain false propositions exclusively and be valid nevertheless; for example—All spiders have 6 legs; All six legged creatures have wings. ∴ All spiders have wings. A deductive argument fails to establish the truth of its conclusion if it is unsound. And to test the truth or falsehood of the premises is the task of science in general. The logician is not so much interested in the truth or falsehood of propositions as in the logical relations between them. The use of language is necessary, and the use of language complicates our problem. Certain accidental or misleading propositions may make the task of investigating the logical relations between the propositions more difficult.”

Bertrand Russell and Moore had profound influence in shaping the course of analytical philosophy. Both rejected Idealism. Russell rejected internality of relations propounded by Idealists. The idealist error is, in the main, a logical error. They failed to see that all meaningful propositions are of subject–predicate form. Wittgenstein’s task was primarily the activity of classifying language. The philosophers’ task is to show the person who is puzzled by metaphysical questions that it is meaningless and unanswerable. The famous last sentence of the *Tractatus*—“Where-of one cannot speak, there-of one must be silent” expresses the essential doctrine of Wittgenstein’s early view. Later philosophers of analysis, like John Austin,

gave prominence to the study of Grammar, and Austin never endorsed Wittgenstein's speculations about the ultimate fate of philosophy.<sup>153</sup> Wittgenstein's last statement, if metalogically interpreted, would lead us to the formulation of the *Avaktavya* concept in the *Syādvāda*. The real activity of thought tends to fall outside the calculus of relations. In the Pragmatic logic we have logic of the type which is fundamentally psychological. It claims to cover the whole field of philosophy. A judgement is practical and not to be divorced with improper abstractions from the purpose and will that informs it. A concept is instrumental to an end beyond itself without any validity other than its values for action. The earlier symbolic logicians made little or no effort to deal with most propositions of every-day life, like – Brutus killed Ceaser; and Brutus and Ceaser were friends. The relations are complex and we have to accept the multi-faceted relational complex<sup>154</sup>. Post demonstrated in 1920 that the *Principia mathematica* axiom system for the logic of statement connections has the property of consistency that it is complete in the sense that every true law of that logic may be got as a theorem in the system. Post's paper in 1920 gave an outline of his invention of an *n-valued logic* of statement connections, that is a logic in which not only the true values *v* (validity) and *f* (Falsehood) but any number of *n* values may be given to its statements. At the same time, the invention of a 3-valued logic was made by Łukasiewicz, for example if the three values are *v* (true), *f* (false) and *u* (uncertain), then the definitions of the values of *Ns* (= 'not-s') and *sCt* (= 'if s then t') are as in the table 5 –

153. *Classics of Analytical Philosophy*. Edr. Robert R Ammerman (McGraw Hill 1965 T M H Edn.) pp. 54.

154. *Encyclopedia Britanica*. Vol 14 Logic.



s	Ns	s	t	sc t
v	t	v	v	v
u	u	v	u	u
f	v	v	f	f
		u	v	v
		u	u	v
		u	f	u
		f	v	v
		f	u	v
		f	f	v

The *n-valued* and 3-valued logics of Post and Lukasiewicz are interesting in themselves and are important for certain parts of metamathematics.

The *n-valued* and 3-valued logics are more concerned with the analysis of the truth-falsity and uncertainty statements concerning propositions and not so much connected with the epistemological and psychological background of the statements. It has primarily linguistic overtones.<sup>155</sup>

It is now recognised that all demonstration is purely formal. So that the *validity* of reasoning with regard to any matter of fact is wholly dependent upon the formal properties of the objects that enter into the reasoning. Thus logic is purely formal.<sup>156</sup>

This brief reference to the path that logic has taken in the West has left us wondering as to where we are going. In the Modern age logicians have tried to free logic from the bondage of Aristotle's formalism. But they have, strange to say, built a super-formal structure of logical analysis far removed from experience and concreteness of thought. We wanted to find a methodology of thought and to discover truth values. We have,

155. Nidditch (P. H.): *The development of Mathematical Logic* (Routledge Kegan Paul. 1962) pp. 80-82.

156. Stebbing (L. S.): *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (Methuen. 1930 pp. 487.

instead, entered the field of mathematics of logic and the calculus of logic. In this over-specialisation, we have lost the wood in the trees. Strange to find in the discussions about Indian Logic in the Encyclopedia of philosophy and many philosophical works in the West, there is hardly any mention of Jaina logic, although there are brief, perhaps, inadequate references to other systems of Indian philosophy, like the Buddhist and the Nyāya<sup>157</sup>. Perhaps they have not come across the works of eminent Jaina logicians, like Akalanka. It is necessary that Western Scholars should realise that study of logic would not be complete without reference to the analysis in depth of the concepts of Jaina logic. It is the task of the scholars in India to point out the profundity of thought and the depth of scholarship in the Jaina concepts of *anekānta*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. The present development of Western logic is only an aspect of the Jaina theory of *Anekānta*. The *anekānta* and *nayavāda* have epistemological overtones. *Syādvāda* is meta-logic.

The synoptic presentation of reality by *Syādvāda* gives a true picture of reality in all its aspects and that is the essence of the Jaina outlook, which helps to remove the intellectual cobwebs arising out of *ekānta*. The *syādvāda* of the Jainas affirms that a thing is never destroyed; and that which is not, never comes into being<sup>158</sup>. In this sense the *syādvāda* presents the possibility of predicating different characteristics of the object from the points of view of substance which is permanent and the modes which are changing<sup>159</sup>.

The theory and methodology of *Syādvāda* need to be studied in all its implications in the scientific and metaphysical

157 I have referred here to the article on Logic- Indian Logic in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Editor in Chief - Paul Edward, McMillan and Free Press, U S S 1967) Vol 4

158. *Pancāstikāyasthāna* . 15, *Bhavassanantthi* , natthi abhavassa uppādo

159 *Anuyogadvāra* :

"Adipamavyomasambhavam, syādvādamudhranti bhedi vastu I

Tannīyamevaikamanīyamānya diti syādvānavadhisatam pralāpah II"

## *Syadvada*

concepts. It needs to be analysed in the methodological schemata by further extensive research not only with reference to the ancient texts but more specially with reference to modern advanced concepts in logic, metaphysics and empirical sciences. *Syadvada* is as much a theory of logic as a methodology of investigation.

This is the *Anekanta* attitude of the Jainas. The Jaina emphasis of the material and the spiritual as the synthesis of opposites leads to a concrete 'universal involving unity in diversity'. It is comparable to Jasper's 'unfanatical absoluteness'. Jainas in their theory of *anekanta* illustrate a non-attachment of partial truths; and they have made creative use of the contradictions by removing the sting out of them, Heidegger presents a similar view<sup>160</sup>.

*Anekanta* is the panacea for the ills of the present day society. In political life, *Pancasila* expresses the spirit of *Anekanta*<sup>161</sup>.

The conditions of Society in the present day world demand that we adopt such a catholic outlook or else we perish. We are in the midst of a life where hatred, injustice and intolerance reign supreme. A new orientation of values would be necessary for us to destroy the inverted values and then rebuild to our heart's desire. What we need today is love and sympathy and not prejudice and pomp. We need understanding and a sense of fellowship between the peoples of the world. And *Anekanta* would give us a 'Weltanschauung' and a scientific interpretation of things. We shall then learn to love our neighbours as ourselves. We can still cherish the hope when power becomes ashamed to occupy its throne and when the morning comes cleansing the bloodstained steps of the nation', we shall be called upon to bring the spirit of *Anekanta* to sweeten the purity of human destiny.<sup>162</sup>

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160. Marshall (Margaret) Willey, *Vishvabharati Quarterly*, Calcutta Vol. XXVIII-2, 1962-63, pp. 116-138.

161. Kalghatgi (TG) *Jaina View of Life* (Jivara) Granthamala, 20) 1969 p. 32.

162. Ibid. p. 191.

## COMMENTS

Dr. Kalghatgi has placed students of comparative philosophy and religion under a great debt by his seminal understanding and lucid exposition of the *Anekānta* and *Nayavāda* on which he dealt with in the course of the Raj Krishan Jain Memorial Lecture (in three parts) which Shri Prem Chandra Jain has instituted in the University of Delhi as an annual feature in memory of his father. *Ekānta* (single) and *Anekānta* (Multiple) *vāda* are really aspects of consciousness associated with *Antaḥkaraṇa*. The six *darśanas* of Hindu philosophy (*Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyāya*, *Saṃkhya*, *Mīmāṃsā*, *Yoga* and *Vedānta*) are well-known. There is a nine-fold sub-division known to Jaina scholars.

Dr. Kalghatgi cites in support of his view, that Jainism is a Pre-Aryan religion which prevailed in India long before Mahāvira and Pārśva, the last two Tirthankaras. It is well known that Mahāvira was the 24th (the last) Tirthankara to expound the Jaina teachings. Dr. Kalghatgi points out that there is reference in the Vedic and Buddhist literature, etc. to Jainism as *Arhat Dharma*, which shares the belief of the Self getting bound with *Karma* and that the goal of every birth is to be free, which seems possible by self-effort. This finds an echo in the *Bhagavad-Gīta* which is explicit that it is possible for one to raise himself by himself; a person who does not do this is his own enemy.

Dr. Kalghatgi explains the involvement of Indian philosophy with logic, epistemology, metaphysics and even the way towards the ideal life of *Muni* and householder alike, aside from art and architecture also. But the above study is confined by Dr. Kalghatgi to the contribution of Jainism to logic, particularly *Anekānta* and *Syādvāda*.

Dr. Kalghatgi states that philosophy begins in speculation; it may be even truer to say that the first step in philosophy is not really a step; if step at all it is, is as simple as opening one's eyes. What is at the core of Indian thought, as one can see from Śāṅkara, is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual progress. This is what Rajaji said so pithily : knowledge when it matures and is stabilised in the intellect becomes wisdom. Will Durant lamented that knowledge today no longer generates wisdom, he is in the pitiable situation of "more and more people knowing more and more about less and less, and less people knowing less and less about more and more."

The computers so far in common use only piled up information quantitatively under the load of which human knowledge, itself splitting up earlier into a thousand isolated fragments; no quantitative analysis seems possible of this huge pile which has accumulated. This has added a new dimension to what the Cambridge philosophers had done, bringing philosophy to the brink of extinction by rendering it "important non-sense". If logical syntax, even at the higher levels of discussion, has led philosophy to a blind alley, even the epoch-making Chomskian contribution to linguistics has not helped appreciably to repair the damage thus done. One has really to go back to the "*Sarvavidyā Pratiṣṭā*" of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, the true spiritual perception (*Darśana*) which the six systems of Hindu Philosophy gave us. Dr. Kalghatgi sincerely laments that pure speculative efforts at philosophising has led us to an impasse from which we cannot escape.

Right knowledge involves right understanding. The Mīmāṃsakas have taught us that the right answer cannot be got except by posing the right question. It is not mere syncreticism (*sāmaṇya*) that can help; we need a proper synthesis (*samanyava*). If *mokṣa* is the commonly sought for end of life it could not even be understood as mere release. Today's psychological understanding is that mere "freedom from" cannot by itself lead to "freedom to"; this was explained by the greatest Western

psychologist of recent years Erich From. Not only the intellect, not only the instinctive tendencies caused by emotions, but every thing that might be termed as lower, physical vital mental (as explained by Shri Aurobindo) could be transformed.

It is interesting to see the development of Indian philosophic thought : Sankara emphasising identity, Buddhism presenting "becoming" (change or difference) Indian philosophy (*Sankara*, *Bhedabheda-Vāda* and *Viśiṣṭadvaita*) subordinating difference to identity, *Vaiśeṣika* (*dvaita* of Madhvāchārya) subordinating identity to difference and the Jaina view seeking to coordinate both identity and difference. *Anekānta* is the response to the *ekānta*, in an effort to provide a comprehensive scheme of realism, a "many-sided" approach to the study of problems. Dr. Kalghatgi rightly points out that this *Anekānta* view, though a special feature of the Jaina point of view, is also to be found in Buddhist philosophy. The problem of body-mind, which Rāmānuja developed later as the *śarīra śarīri bhāva*, was also dealt with in his own way by Mahāvīra, when he said the body is identical with the soul; in different respects. The universe is mirrored in the soul; since the Universe, which is itself mirrored, is infinitely complex, experimental powers have to be manifold, commensurate with the complexity of the experienced Universe. Dr. Kalghatgi traces how this aspect has received much greater attention in the Jaina *prākṛit* literature, to start with, and occupied an important place later, in the Jaina Sanskrit literature also. In essence, *Anekānta vāda* is the theory of reality which asserts in a manifoldness and complexity of the real, crystalised itself as a supplementary process, in the two-fold dialect of *Nayavāda* and *śādvāda*, thus supplying a very broad base for the development of the realistic presupposition of Jaina metaphysics (vide Dr. Upadhye, whom Dr. Kalghatgi quotes).

*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* regards *jñāna* as an independent category, the soul being the substratum. But *Nyāya* makes knowledge an attribute of the soul without any essential attribute. The

characterisation of *ekānta* as dogmatism (one-sided) as much as the understanding of non-duality as *mithyā-vāda* may not be accurate. Dr Kalghatgi emphasises that if understanding is pure in its essence then *ekānta* disappears. This has been further amplified by Shri Aurobindo as pure consciousness and the super-Mind. Tailard-de-Chardin would speak of Noosphere.

The Jainas have endeavoured to avoid the expression of partial truth by knowing an object, as it happens in this oft-repeated example of seven blind men and the elephant. Not only the actual mode of apprehension but the dimensions (not merely the angles) from which anything is perceived are important. In empirical experience, however, we are confined to cognition, comprehension, and communication. We also make a distinction between primary and secondary emphasis, according to the nature of discourse itself. For example, the *dharma* is distinguished from *dharmi* (a thing and its attribute.) In this light when we refer to the *Jiva*, we may give emphasis to substance and secondary importance to the modes of characteristics like that of knowledge. But when one speaks of *Jñāna* and *jīva*, importance may be given to the knowledge as the characteristic of *jīva* and substantiality of *Jiva* may go to the background. The *Vaiśeṣika* emphasises the exclusive distinction between the thing and its attributes. The *Sāṃkhya*, does not understand knowledge as inherent in the self but as the product of *Prakṛti*. It is, therefore, necessary to find out the common characteristics in particular similar objects on the basis of resemblances in particular respects. This ultimately leads to the concept of the universal particular; in other words, essence. The dichotomy of *jīvatma* and *paramātma*, in other words, would be that of totality and minutique.

Each point of view, therefore, represents one of the many ways from which a thing can be looked at, these points of view are relative; over-emphasis of one point of view as absolute or meaningless as much as stress of many points of view at the same time may be equally mistakes. These would result in

*abhasa* or appearance of partial truth only. The Jainas would of course claim that their point of view is absolute and unerring, while others represent only the partial truth. It was stated the *Nyayacakra* purifies all the *śāstras*. The Jaina literature is replete with not mere logic but also effort itself, subsuming knowledge being self-illuminating, it illumines the object of knowledge as well. But, in the course of these brief comments it would not be possible to do justice to the cogent and logical presentation of various aspects of *anekānta* and *naya* by Dr. Kalghatgi. It will pay to closely read what he has forcefully wonderfully and loudly explained. Both the experiment as well as the experimenter in nucleus are the same.

In the second lecture Dr. Kalghatgi explains *Pramāṇa* and *Nikṣepa*: the manner in which the Jainas develop a systematic theory of logic.

In the third lecture all the aspects of truth are woven into a synthesis of dialectic. *Syād* means a particular point of view, *vāda* means the presentation of it. These are efforts to combat one-sided and dogmatic presentations of truth, in fragments. Dr. Kalghatgi attempts to review the criticism made by Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja that the above Jaina approach is merely a sort of compromise. Dr. Kalghatgi recalls what Dr. Radhakrishnan said, after mentioning the strong points of *Syādvāda*: Assuming the Jaina logic leads to linguistic idealism (by which he means the hypothesis of the absolute), and in so far as the Jainas shrink from it, they are untrue to their own logic. The counter argument was furnished by the *Saptabhaṅgi Tarāṅgiṇī*: if the final release and final bliss is the eternal and existing, where is the chance for *Samsāri* obtaining *Mokṣa*? Dr. Radhakrishnan would say that complex nature of reality reconciles all difference in itself.

After quoting Dr. Kothari's explanation of the principle of complementarity, Dr. Kalghatgi hopes *Anekānta* would give us the *Weltanschauung* by a scientific interpretation of things when alone we shall learn to live with our neighbours.



It seems to me that the whole difficulty arises by reason of the mind, which is divisive, trying to paceive the Indivisible Reality. The Gestalt thinkers saw this difficulty clearly: the sum of the parts may, depending on the angle of vision, be either less or more than the whole.

The truth seems to be nearer to what the Mother pointed out: when man began to separate the spiritual from the material his difficulties began.

A very difficult branch of Indian philosophy has been very clearly presented by Dr. Kalghatgi. Seminal works of this nature alone can leave us with any real hope of Weltanschauung

20-1-84  
New Delhi

S. Rangarajan  
(Retd) Justice Delhi High Court

## **Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi**

The great savant who is to deliver Shri R. K. Jain Memorial Lectures this year is Prof. T. G. Kalghatgi, the emeritus Professor of Prakrit and Jainology in Mysore University, Mysore. He was born on the 25th April, 1918 at Khanapur, in the district of Belgaum of Bombay State. He received his earlier education in local school and received M. A. degree in Philosophy from Bombay University, Bombay in 1944. Further, he worked on "Some Problems of Jaina Psychology" and got Ph. D. degree in 1958 from Karnatak University, Dharwad.

Prof. Kalghatgi has been teaching and conducting researches in Jainology for more than thirty eight years. He served many institutions, like Willingdon College, Sangli, Rajaram College, Kolhapur, Karnatak College, Dharwad as Lecturer in Philosophy. He was Principal of Karnatak Arts College for about ten years and thereafter as a Professor of Philosophy in the Karnatak University Dharwad. He adorned the coveted Chair of Professor and Head of the Department of Prakrit and Jainology in the University of Mysore and while working there, made commendable contributions in the field of Jaina learning. He recently retired from this position.

Prof. Kalghatgi is a versatile genius in Jaina learning. Besides his more than hundred research papers, published in India and abroad, there are four valuable books— 'Some Problems in Jaina Psychology', 'Karma and Rebirth', 'Jaina View of Life' and 'Jainism through Prakrit sources' at his credit. The books edited by him are the "Karnatakadalli Jaina Dharma (Kannada), 'Jainism — A Study' (English, part Kannada) Tirthankara Parsvanatha— A Study (English, part Kannada) and 'Jainism and Karnatak Culture'. He organised several Seminars in different Universities in India and participated in them in-

various capacities. He delivered special Lectures on many aspects of Prakrit and Jainology in the University of Madras, Punjabi University, Patiala, University of Jammu, and the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. These days, he is engaged in finalizing the manuscripts of Critical Studies like 'Acārya Umasvāti - A Study,' 'Kundakundacārya- A Study'. 'Acārya Samantabhadra- A Study' etc. His whole academic life is an epitome of the complete devotion, untiring zeal and continuous effort in unearthing the reality from the hidden treasure of Jaina learning and making the same accessible to the Scholars.

## हमारे अन्य प्रकाशन

१. भक्ति गुच्छक— (स्तोत्र, पाठ और पूजा आदि का अपूर्व संग्रह)  
६३१ पृष्ठ का गुटका । मूल्य ५ रुपये
२. अभ्यात्म तरेंगिणी— रचयिता, आचार्य सोमदेव, संस्कृत टीकाकार  
आ० गणधरकीर्ति, हिन्दी टीकाकार— प० पन्नालाल साहित्राचार्य  
मूल्य ५ रुपये
३. युगवीर भारती—  
प० जुगलकिशोरजी मुस्तार की कविताओं का संग्रह मूल्य ३ रुपये
४. भगवान महावीर— (लेखिका रमादेवी जैन) मूल्य ३ रुपये
५. हरिवंश कथा— मूल लेखक : आचार्य जिनसेन, रूपांतरकार :  
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६. प्रद्युम्न चरित्र— (बाल संस्करण) श्रीमती परा जैन मूल्य ३ रुपये
७. हरिवंश कथा— " " " " मूल्य ३ रुपये
८. तन से लिपटी खेल (उपन्यास)—  
लेखक— श्री आनन्द प्रकाश जैन (सजित्व) मूल्य १० रुपये
९. पुराने घाट नई सीढ़ियाँ— डा० नेमिचन्द्र जैन, ज्योतिषाचार्य  
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१०. समयसार— आचार्य कुन्दकुन्दाचार्य द्वारा "श्री राजकृष्णजी जैन  
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११. नियमसार— आचार्य कुन्दकुन्दाचार्य द्वारा "श्री राजकृष्णजी जैन"  
द्वारा गाथाओं के अंग्रेजी रूपांतर सहित (प्रेस में)

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(श्री राजकृष्ण जैन बेरिटेबल ट्रस्ट द्वारा संचालित)

